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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying
Defendant's motion for a new trial?

2.

Are the orders appealed from invalid because they fail
to meet the statutory requirements of procedure and
substance?

3.

Did the District Court have jurisdiction to enter the
orders being appealed?

4.

Is the final order being appealed invalid for lack of
constitutional due process?

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant was tried for theft in October of 1982 and
a guilty verdict was entered (R. 165). A sentencing hearing
was held on November 26, 1982/ at which time the defendant
presented his motions for a new trial and arrest of judgment
(R. 171-183).

The transcript of that hearing has been lost

and the only written record is an unsigned minute entry
(R. 185).

The pertinent part of the minute entry is the

last paragraph, which reads as follows:
Defendant sentenced this time as follows:
Term in the Utah State Prison not to exceed
five years, fined 5,000.00. Fine and prison
sentence stayed and the Defendant is placed
on probation for 2 years. Defendant is to
work for the Utah County Sanity Administration
one day a week for 50 weeks, with no charge to
Utah County or to the State of Utah. Restitu-
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tion shall be as determined in the Civil law
suit re: Charley Joseph and Joseph Mascaro.
Defendant is on stiff probation for two years
and is not to use liquor, drugs, or make any
violation of the law during that period. Crime
charged "theft by deception" is reduced to a
Third Degree Felony", Work arrangements shall
be arranged through the Sanity Administration
by way of the Adult Probation and Parole Office.
Defendant entered into a Probation Agreement dated December 1,
1982.

(A copy is included in the Addendum.

Reference to the

Probation Agreement is made in the District Court ! s Order
extending probation (R. 193-194) and in the report of the
probation officer to the Court (R. 227-228.)
No written judgment, order, or sentence was entered at
that time, and the Defendant, incorrectly believing that the
minute entry constituted the "final judgment" filed a notice
of appeal in December of 1982 (R. 186). Neither the Attorney
General nor

the Supreme Court noticed the lack of the entry

of a sentencing order as required by Section 77-35-22(c),
Utah Code Ann. (1953).

The Utah Supreme Court issued its

opinion on June 25, 1984 (R. 202-208) affirming the District
Court.

Re-hearing was denied on October 2, 1984 (R. 201).

Defendant's appeal was based on four points of error,
one of which was that the District Court allowed the jury to
take a deposition of the Defendant with them into their
deliberations (Exhibit P-l).

The Defendant was not aware of

that error until he was preparing his appellate brief, and
the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged the "commission of the
asserted error" (R. 208) but deemed it waived due to the
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"absence of a proper and seasonable objection11 (R. 208) to
the District Court.
On November 26, 1984 the District Court entered an Order
extending Defendant's probation to April 1, 1985 (R. 193-194).
On November 10, 1984 the Defendant filed motions in the District
Court to amend the minute entry dated November 26, 1982 to
correct some errors therein, and to amend the original motions
for a new trial and for arrest of judgment based on the jury
taking the deposition with them into their deliberations.
(These motions are included in the Addendum.

Judge Tibbs,

being in the Sixth Judicial District, maintains his own personal
file there (R. 248).

These motions are most likely in that file

and were not returned with the regular court file to Utah County.
There is adequate reference to these motions in the documents
setting up the hearing in Manti (R. 210-211) and the minute
entry of the hearing on the motions (R. 212-215) and the court
Order resulting from that hearing on the motions (R. 232-234).)
On January 30, 1985 a hearing on Defendant's motions
was held before the District Court.

The Judge refused to

amend the minute entry on the grounds that it did not constitute the order of the Court and could not be relied upon to
accurately reflect the Court's verbal order (R. 212). He
also denied Defendant's motion to amend the original motions
for a new trial and for arrest of judgment.

The deputy county

attorney was ordered to prepare the order for this ruling and
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to obtain a transcript of the November 26, 1982 hearing so
that an accurate sentencing order could be prepared.

(No

one was aware at that time that the court reporter's notes
had been lost. )
The deputy county attorney, Mr. Killpack, shortly
thereafter left the county attorney's office for employment
in another county office and the orders for the hearings on
November 26, 1982 and January 30, 1985 were not prepared or
timely filed.

In mid-July, 1985, it came to Mr. Killpack's

attention that he had neglected to prepare those orders and
he drafted the two orders along with his affidavit indicating
that the transcript could not be found for the hearing on
November 26, 1982, and that his draft order was prepared from
his own recollection and from the unsigned minute entry.

(Se&

cover letter sent to Judge Tibbs in Addendum dated July 17,
1985. )
The copies of the proposed orders and affidavit were
sent to the Defendant in Provo, mailed from Provo, on July 22,
1985 (R. 231, 234, 238).

The copies of the proposed orders

were sent from Provo to Judge Tibbs in Manti, Utah, along
with an affidavit dated July 19, 1985 (R. 230) and a cover
letter dated July 17, 1985 (See copy in the Addendum).

There

is no proof of the date or time of mailing to Judge Tibbs,
but it could not have been after the mailing to the Defendant,
because the proposed orders were signed by Judge Tibbs in Manti
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on July 23, 1985 (R. 233, 237).
Defendant filed his objections to the proposed orders
on July 31, 1985 (R. 216-224) and a hearing was held on
October 1, 1985 (R. 226).

In the meantime, the proposed

orders, that had been signed, were held and not entered.
At the hearing, the District Court decided to enter the
two proposed orders and to deny Defendant's renewed motions
for a new trial and arrest of judgment (R. 239-245).

The

Court also decided to terminate probation, except for restitution, and to hold a restitution hearing on October 28, 1985
to satisfy the objections of the Defendant.
Judge Tibbs decided that he did not want to take testimony at the restitution hearing, so he clearly specified as
part of his Order on October 1, 1985 (R. 243-245) that the
County Attorney must establish its claim for restitution by
documentation which is supported by affidavits, and that the
County Attorney must furnish copies of its documentation to
the Defendant within fifteen (15) days from the date of the
hearing to give sufficient time for the Defendant to prepare
his counter documentation before the restitution hearing on
October 28, 1985.
No documentation or affidavits were presented to the
Defendant prior to the restitution hearing.

At the hearing

the deputy county attorney presented documentation to support
her claims, but with no affidavits as previously specified
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by the Court.

The Court also indicated that he had received

a letter from one of the victim's civil attorneys and a phone
call from the attorney of the other victim, but the deputy
county attorney told the Judge that both of those attorneys
had told her that they didn't consider it worth their time to
prepare affidavits to substantiate their claims.

The Defendant

objected to the introduction of the State f s documents, but was
overruled and was allowed to introduce some documentation to
counter the State's documents, although he had no advance notice
of what the State was going to present.
The District Court ordered Defendant to pay 73,461.45 in
restitution, retroactive to November 26, 1982, (See copy of the
proposed order in the Addendum) but up to this point the order
has not been entered.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Defendant argues that he has now complied with the
requirement of making a proper challenge in the District
Court to the reversible error of the jury taking the deposition
into its deliberations.

The District Court abused its discre-

tion in refusing to grant Defendant's motion for a new trial.
Defendant also argues that the post-conviction orders entered
by the District Court are invalid and violative of Defendant's
rights because they fail to conform to the procedural, statutory,
and constitutional requirements of the criminal proceedings.
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IE NTS
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING DEFENDANT»q AMENDED MOTION FOR A
NEW TRIAL,
J . .
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counsel approached the bench and out of jury
hearing said m o t i o n , the Defendant renewed its
motion for m i s t r i a l . Motion denied. The Case
is submitted to the jury at t'ms
time.
Bailiff
Willis Vincent took, the jury to lunch j r . : time, and admonished to keep the jury tugecne:.
Jury is to jo directly to jury room to
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"

hours) Clerk called the roll and all jurors
were present. Jury Foreman, Alan C. Cameron,
stated the jury had reached a verdict."
The transcript of the proceedings of the trial as recorded by the Court Reporter record the following events:
The record should indicate we 1 re
outside the presence of the jury.

THE COURT:

MR. STANGER;;

Your Honor, I would again make a
motion for a mistrial on the basis
that on four different occasions on
the grounds that the Prosecutor is
telling the jury of the fiduciary
duty by lawyers and their clients.

Well, your motion is denied. The Court
feels that this is proper argument.

THE COURT:
MR. STANGER:

Thank you.

(After the matter was argued to the Court and jury
by both sides, the jury retired to the jury room
for the determination of a verdict.)
(Whereupon a rollcall was made of the jury and all
the jurors were present.)
THE COURT:
FOREMAN:

Ladies and gentlemen, have you reached
a verdict?

We have.

The deposition marked Exhibit P-l was taken into the
deliberations of the jury and weighed heavily in reaching a
verdict, as shown in the affidavit of a member of the jury
attached to Defendant's motion in the Addendum.
Taking depositions into the jury room during deliberations
is prohibited by statute in the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
"Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury
may take with the the instructions of the
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court and i_l exhibits and papers which have
been received as evidence, except depostions;
and each juror may also take with him any
notes of the testimony or other proceedings
taken by himself, but not taken by any other
person.
(emphasis added.) (Sectio n 7 7 3 5 ] 7 ( k ) ,
Utah Code Ann. ( 1953)) .
The basis

..

:/._ ..utu'-i

.
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1 a \, i. n U t a:. f or nor ^ \- h dM Z o r t y y e a r .->.
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''documentary

evidence".

- i i c* r

r e p o r t e r , t r a n s c r i b e d and c e r t i f i e d , is n o t
d o c u m e n t a r y e v i d e n c e to oe r^ce-v^d in w r i t i n g
and jiven : • ' - ; . . "
The reasoninq of L 11 >j "our t In the So] onion c a s e is s e t
for tl: i :)! I page 8 ] 1

I

"A written instrument, made an exhibit in
the cause but not consisting of testimony
of a witness in the case, may of course be
taken to the jury room the same as m a p s ,
diagrams, and other exhibits. But the
testimony of a witness is in a different
category. Such is t h e p ro v i s io n o f t h e
statutes and the common law always excluded
depositions and written testimony from being
c a rri e d f ro m t h e b a r b y t h e j u ry . We c a n see
no reason why the court should depart from
the well established rule. It may often
happen that the testimony on one side is oral
from witnesses produced before the jury, while
the testimony for the other side on essential
matters is in the form., of depositions or in
the transcript from, testimony at a previous
hearing, If the hearing lasts for any length
of time and the jury takes the depositions or
transcript to be read and discussed whi le the
oral evidence contra has in measure faded from
the memory of the jurors, it is obvious that the
side sustained by written, evidence is given an
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undue advantage. The law does not permit
depositions or witnesses to go to the jury
room. Why should a witness be permitted to
go there in the form of written testimony?11
(citations omitted) (emphasis added)
The fact situation in this case falls squarely within
the example discussed in the Solomon case.

The evidence by

the State included the deposition which went to the jury
deliberations, whereas the evidence by the Defendant was oral
and none of it went with the jury in written testimony.

As

the Utah Supreme Court said, "it is obvious that the side
(the State in this case) sustained by written evidence is given
an undue advantage.11

It is likely that the jury might have

reached a different verdict if they had not had the deposition
with them for five and a half hours in deliberations.

By any

interpretation, the Defendant failed to receive a fair trial
and the error is reversible.
The facts of this case, as described in the minute entry
of the Clerk and the transcript of proceedings by the Court
Reporter, cited above, show that there was also error and
impropriety in the way the Court failed to control the issuance of the exhibits to the jury as they went into deliberations.
The Court chose to recess the proceedings and send the jury to
lunch immediately prior to the commencement of their deliberations.

The State and the Defendant were both justified under

the circumstances to assume that the Court would either take
personal supervision or properly instruct the Bailiff, in the
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Judge's anticipated absence, to make sure that Rule 17(k)
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure was properly complied
with, in that the jury was to be given the instructions of the
court and all of the exhibits and papers which were received
in evidence, but to exclude the depositions.

The failure of

the Court to responsibly handle its duty at a time when the
proceedings were in recess and the parties were not present
to personally observe which items were given to the jury, not
only resulted in the error by the jury, but it also denied the
Defendant of due process in this case at a critical time when
actions were taken and decisions made which could

and did

result in a detriment to him.
Another error or impropriety which had a substantial
adverse effect upon the rights of the Defendant was in the
way the Court handled the request by the jury that they be
given a copy of Defendant's testimony.

The record in this case

includes a short note on a small piece of paper, signed by the
jury foreman, requesting that the jury be given a copy of
Defendant's testimony (R. 132).

The Court denied the request,

not in the presence of the parties or their Counsel, and told
the jury to use their best memory, and then directed the
Clerk to attach the note to the jury instructions in the
Court's file.

The court record gives no other indication that

the parties were notified of the request by the jury or the
response by the Court, or that the parties had access to the
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Court's file after this incident and prior to the verdict
by the jury.

While the procedure followed by the Court may be

allowable under the Rules, the request by the jury should have
alerted the Court that the jury had some sort of document,
such as the deposition, to which it was giving serious consideration, and the jury wanted to also consider that Defendant's
explanation in written form.

This is a fact which the Judge

knew, or should have known at that point, but which he failed
to disclose to the Defendant.

This also resulted in a lack of

due process for the Defendant and for which the Defendant should
have been made aware.
It is likely that the outcome of this case might have
been different and in the Defendant's favor if these errors
and improprieties had not been allowed to occur.

In the

interest of justice a new trial should be granted because of
the substantial adverse effect upon the rights of the Defendant.
In the District Court proceedings the State objected on
the grounds that Section 77-35-24(c), Utah Code Ann. (1953),
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, limits the time
within which a motion for a new trial may be made.

It says:

"A motion for a new trial shall be made within ten days after
imposition of sentence, or within such further time as the
Court may fix during the ten-day period."

Appellant has no

argument with the rule, but it is wellestablished law in the
State of Utah and elsewhere that statements made by the trial
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judge are not the sentence and judgment of the case, and it
is only the signed order that prevails.

State v. Gerrard,

Utah, 584 P.2d 885 (1978); U. S. v. Coleman, 9th Circuit 688
F.2d 663 (1982); State v. Sawyer, 54 Utah 275, 182 P. 206 (1919);
McCollum v. Clothier, 121 Utah 311, 241 P.2d 468 (1952);
Newton v. State Road Commission, 23 Utah 2d 350 463 P.2d 565
(1970).

Therefore, the imposition of sentence did not occur

until October 2, 1985 when the order was entered by the clerk.
This was almost one year after Defendant's motion was filed
on November 10, 1984.
It is also clear by the wording of the Order of Sentence
that was entered October 2, 1985 (R. 235-238) that the trial
judge intended to suspend the imposition of sentence on November 26, 1982.

Section 76-3-201(1), Utah Code Ann. (1953)

lists the categories to which a Defendant may be sentenced.
They include imprisionment, fine, and probation.

Section 77-

18-1(1), Utah Code Ann. (1953), as it read on November 26,
1982 said,
"On a . . . conviction of any crime or offense,
if it appears compatible with the public interest,
the court may suspend the imposition or
execution of sentence and place the defendant
on probation for such period of time as
it determines."
In the Order of Sentence in this case the Defendant is
"sentenced to imprisonment" in paragraph no. 2 and "ordered
to pay a fine" in paragraph no. 3.

- 15 -

In paragraph no. 4 it says,

"The fine and prison sentence are both stayed and the defendand is placed on probation • . . . ,f
to probation.

There is no sentencing

Section 77-35-22, Utah Code Ann. (1953), Rule

22, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure deals with the procedure
to be followed in sentencing, and Subsection (d) says,
"When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall
issue its commitment setting forth the sentence."

Since no

order of "commitment" was issued or intended, it is clear
that the trial judge did not "impose" a prison sentence.
Since imposition of sentence was suspended, there was no tenday time limit within which the Defendant had to file his
motion for a new trial to avoid waiving that opportunity.
Several cases also make it clear that an order of probation
does not constitute an imposition of sentence.
Fla.App. 356 So.2d 72 (1978).

Bracey v. State,

If there is an imposition of

sentence it is not within the power of the court to reduce
the time to be served, State v. Schreuder, Utah, 25 Utah Adv.
Rep. 13 (1985), and therefore there can be

no probation

ordered by the court.
There is also nothing in Section 77-35-24, Utah Code Ann.
(1953), Rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which limits
the imposition of sentence to just one occasion.

The cases

consider a reduction of sentence, a corrected sentence, a
second sentence, and an amended sentence all as an imposition
of sentence.

In this case, the trial judge originally left
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uncertain the amount of restitution to be paid by the Defendant.

When that amount was made certain, it could be classi-

fied as an imposition of sentence if the original order were
also classified as an imposition of sentence.

In fact, three

of the four orders being appealed herein are called an "order
of sentence.11

Therefore, the motion for a new trial made on

November 10, 1984 was made prior to the ten-day time limit
following

POINT II:

the second and third imposition of sentence.

THE TWO ORDERS FILED OCTOBER 2, 1985 ARE INVALID
BECAUSE THEY DO NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF
RULE 2.9 OF THE RULES OF PRACTICE IN THE DISTRICT
COURTS.

Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice in the District Courts
and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah is applicable in this
instance because Rule 3.1 of the same Rules clearly states,
"These rules shall govern the practice and
procedure in the District Courts and Circuit
Courts of the State of Utah in all matters
not specifically covered by the Utah Code of
Criminal Procedure or Rules of Criminal
Procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court."
Rule 2.9(a) says:
"In all rulings by a court, counsel for the
party or parties obtaining the ruling shall
within fifteen (15) days, or within shorter
time as the court may direct, file with the
court a proposed order, judgment or decree
in conformity with the ruling."
No provision is made for extending the time within which a
proposed order may be filed.
Rule 2.9(b) also says,

- 17 -

"Copies of the proposed Findings, Judgments,
and/or Orders shall be served on opposing
counsel before being presented to the court
for signature unless the court otherwise
orders. Notice of objections thereto shall
be submitted to the court and counsel within
five (5) days after service.11
Mr. Killpackfs letter from the County Attorney's office to
the court is dated the 17th of July, 1985 and the mailing
certificates show that such mailings to counsel were not made
until the 22nd of July.

There is nothing to indicate that such

mailings to counsel were prior to the mailing to the court,
and it is doubtful that they were because Judge Tibbs signed
the orders in Manti on July 23rd.
In at least four recent Utah cases, the law has been
clearly established that "compliance with Rule 2.9(b) is necessary in order that a judgment be properly 'filed1

..."

Biqelow v. Inqersoll, Utah, 618 P.2d 50 (1980); Larsen v. Larsen,
Utah, 674 P.2d 116 (1983); Tolboe Construction v. Staker Paving,
Utah, 682 P.2d 843 (1984), Garff v. Richards, Utah, 706 P.2d
1065 (1985).
In the above-entitled case, neither the requirements of
2.9 (a) nor 2.9(b) were met by the County Attorney's office.
A proposed order was not filed within fifteen (15) days after
the November 26, 1982 hearing, and again following the January
30,1985 hearing, when the court made it clear in its order that
counsel for the State was to prepare an Order for the hearing
on November 26, 1982, still no orders were prepared until July
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of 1985. When those orders were prepared, they did not meet
the requirements for service as outlined in Rule 2.9(b),
as discussed above.

POINT III:

ALL FOUR OF THE ORDERS BEING APPEALED ARE
INVALID BECAUSE THEY DO NOT MEET THE
STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS FOR SENTENCING.

Section 76-3-201, Utah Code Ann. (1953), sets out very
specific requirements that must be met when the sentencing
court orders restitution.

Those requirements have not been

met in any of the four orders.
The court must first make a finding that there are
pecuniary damages suffered by the victim.

Pecuniary damages

can only include special damages and not general or punitive
damages, which may be included in a civil judgment.

The court

must also limit those pecuniary damages to the amount that the
victim could actually recover in a civil action against the
defendant.
If the court finds such pecuniary damages, he must make
his reasons a part of the court record as to why restitution
is appropriate or is not appropriate.

He must also show that

he has taken into consideration several specific items which
are listed in the statute.
If the Defendant objects to imposition of restitution
the amount, or the distribution of restitution, which this
Defendant did, the Court must allow the Defendant a full
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hearing on the issue of restitution at the time of sentencing.
These requiremtns have not been met, and therefore, the
written orders do not meet the statutory requirements if the
order for restitution is to be included.

POINT IV:

ALL FOUR OF THE ORDERS BEING APPEALED ARE
INVALID BECAUSE THE JURISDICTION OF THE
DISTRICT COURT TO MAKE SUCH ORDERS HAD
ALREADY TERMINATED.

There is a written order of the Court in the file which
extends the period of probation to April 1, 1985.

The State's

failure to enter a subsequent written order making any further
extensions of the probation period prior to April 1, 1985,
allowed the probationary period and the court's jurisdiction
to terminate as a matter of law.
The District Court was even without jurisdiction to
extend the period of probation to April 1, 1985.

The 1984

amendment to Section 77-18-1, Utah Code Ann. (1953), provides
that following eighteen (18) months of compliance with the
terms of probation, then probation is automatically terminated
as a matter of law.

Since the written order of the Court had

not been filed prior to the effective date of the amendment,
March 23, 1984, this case is governed by the amendment, and
therefore, probation and jurisdiction have terminated as a
matter of law.

The amendment makes no provision for the

extension of probation by the District Court.
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The date of Defendant's Probation Agreement is
December 1, 1982.

Eighteen months following that date

would be June 1, 1984, which was several months prior to
the District Court's extension of probation to April 1, 1985.
If the eighteen months has to run from the effective date of
the amendment, which was March 23, 1984, then probation was
terminated as a matter of law on September 23, 1985, which was
prior to the entry of any of the four orders being appealed.

POINT V:

THE ORDER OF THE HEARING ON OCTOBER 28, 1985
IS INVALID FOR LACK OF DUE PROCESS.

At the hearing on October 1, 1985, the order of the
court clearly set out the notice of the procedure to be
followed in the restitution hearing to be held on October 28,
1985.

The county attorney's office was to furnish all documents

bearing on*the victims' restitution claims to the Defendant
within fifteen days after October 1, 1985.

These documents

were all to be certified to by affidavits as to their accuracy.
This was to give the Defendant adequate notice to prepare any
legal basis he had for disagreeing with the amounts and documents.
The record shows that no documents were fucnished to
the Defendant prior to the hearing on October 28, 1985, and no
affidavits were presented to the court verifying the accuracy
of the documents and restitution amounts claimed.

It also

shows that the court accepted a letter from civil counsel
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of one of the victims and a phone call from counsel of another
victim and included those as part of the basis for making his
decision as to the amount of restitution.
The Defendant had no adequate notice of the procedure
which the District Court Judge followed at the restitution
hearing, he had no adequate notice of the documents presented
by the State as the basis of restitution, and he was not allowed
to present testimony in defense of his position because of the
restrictions given by the Court in the Order of October 1, 1985.
Such lack of notice and of opportunity to fully respond is a
denial of due process afforded to the Defendant by the Utah
State Constitution, Article I, Section 7 and by the U. S. Constitution, 5th and 14th Amendments.

CONCLUSION
Appellant seeks to have his guilty verdict reversed and
the case either dismissed or remanded for a new trial based
on the reversible error of the jury taking the deposition with
them into their deliberations.

In the alternative, appellant

seeks to have the sentencing orders declared invalid due to
lack of jurisdiction, failure to conform to procedural and
substantive requirements and lack of due process, and bo have
the case remanded for new sentencing.

ADDENDUM
The following pages contain the copies relevant to this brief
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lfis

terminate the other's unlawful entry into or attack
upon his habitation; however, h e is justified in the
use o f force which is intended or likely t o cause
death or serious bodily injury only if:
(a) the entry is made o r attempted in a violent
and tumultuous manner, surreptitiously, or by
stealth, and h e reasonably believes that the entry is
attempted or made for the purpose o f assaulting or
offering personal violence t o any person, dwelling,
or being i n the habitation and h e reasonably
believes that the force is necessary t o prevent the
assault or offer of personal violence; or
(b) he reasonably believes that the entry is
made or attempted for the purpose o f committing a
felony in the habitation and that the force is
necessary to prevent the commission of the felony.
(2) The person using force or deadly force in
defense of habitation is presumed for the purpose
of both civil and criminal cases to have acted reasonably and had a reasonable fear o f imminent peril
of death or serious bodily injury if the entry or
attempted entry is unlawful and is made or
attempted by use o f force, or in a violent and turn*
ultuous manner, or surreptitiously or by stealth, or
for the purpose of committing a felony.
was
76-2-606. Force ia defease of property.

A person is justified in using force, other than
deadly force, against another when and to the
extent that be reasonably believes that force is
necessary to prevent or terminate criminal interference with real property or personal property:
(1) Lawfully in his possession; or

(2) Lawfully in the possession o f a member o f his
immediate family; or
(3) Belonging to a person whose property h e hat
a legal duty to protect.
i*TO

Chapter 3. Punishments
Ptftl.
i of Off earn.
fWllo
Part 3. Flats tad Spirit!
Put 4. f fwitliiii ttrt Ipfirlai rmihloai oa

Part 1. Classification of Offenses

76-3-101. Seateadag in

(1) A person adjudged guilty o f an offense under
this code shall be sentenced in accordance with the
provisions of this chapter.
(2) Penal laws enacted after the effective date of
this code shall be classified for sentencing purposes
in accordance with this chapter.
wn
7*4-162. Derigaatioa of offeasea.

Offenses are designated as felonies, misdemeanors, or infractions.
i*n
764-103. Felonies classified.

(1) Felonies are classified into four categories:
(a) Capital felonies;
(b) Felonies of the first degree;
(c) Felonies of the second degree;
(d) Felonies of the third degree.
(2) A n offense designated as a felony either in
this code or ia another law, without specification as
to punishment or category, is a felony o f the third
*****

7 0 4 - 1 0 4 . Misdemeanors classified.
(1) Misdemeanors are classified into three categories:
(a) Class A misdemeanors;
(b) Class B misdemeanors;
(c) Class C misdemeanors.
(2) A n offense designated a misdemeanor, either
i a this code or in another law, without specification
as to punishment or category, is a class B misdemeanor.
1971
76-3-103. Infraction*.

(1) Infractions are not classified.
(2) A n y offense which is an infraction within this
code is expressly designated and any offense defined
outside this code which is not designated as a felony
or misdemeanor and for which no penalty is
specified is an infraction.
1973

Part 2. Sentencing

ascdoa of atfaa*.
764-261.2. Ovi actio* by
764-202* FsfOMd parsons •
•tateaot - That served oa
of partem
764-263. Felony eoavktftea
isoaaaat - firrtaa of
763-264. M l i i i i m
at.
764-206. IsfracaaaceavictkNi - Flat, forfdtare, aad aa»
764-206. Capital Mewy • Death or life i
764-267, Capital fetes? - Statteclag orocwMig
764-260.1
76-3-201. Sentences or
allowed-Ova"
AfjravatJoa or mitigation of

(1) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a
court may sentence a person adjudged guilty o f an
offense t o any o n e o f the following sentences or
combination of such sentences:
(a) to pay a fine; or
(b) t o removal from and/or disqualification o f
public or private office; or
(c) t o probation unless otherwise specifically
provided by law; or
(d) to imprisonment; or
(e) to death.
(2) This chapter shall not deprive a court o f
authority conferred by law to forfeit property,
dissolve a corporation, suspend, or cancel a license
o r permit removal o f a person from office, cite f o r
contempt, or impose any other civil penalty. A civil
penalty may be included in a sentence.
(3Xa) When a person is adjudged guilty o f
criminal activity which has resulted in pecuniary
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may
impose, the court shall order that the defendant
make restitution* u p t o double the amount o f
pecuniary damages to the victim or victims o f the
offense o f which the defendant has pleaded guilty,
is convicted, or t o the victim of any other criminal
conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing
court unless the court in applying the criteria in
Subsection (b) finds that restitution is inappropriate.
If the court determines that restitution is appropri-
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76-3-201

VimnHur

ace. or inappropriate, the- court/ shall maker the
reasons for the decision a part of its written order.
(b) In determining whether or not to order restitution, or restitution which is complete, partial, or
nominal, the court shall take into account:
OX The financial resources o f the defendant
and the burden that- payment of restitution will
impose* with due regard to the other obligations of
thedefendant;
00 The ability of the defendant to pay restitutio© on an installment basis or on other conditions to befixedby the court;
(iii) The rehabilitative effect on the defendant
of the payment of restitution and the method of
payment; and
(iv) Other circumstances which in the opinion
of the court shall make restitution inappropriate.
(c) If the defendant objects to the imposition,
amount, or distribution of the restitution, the court
shall at the time of sentencing allow him a full
hearing on such issue.
(4) As used in subsection (3) above:
(a) "Criminal activities* means any offense
with respect to which the defendant is convicted or
any other criminal conduct for which the defendant
admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or
without an admission of committing the criminal
conduct;
(b) 'Pecuniary damages* means all special
damages, but not general damages, which a person
could recover against the defendant in a civil action
arising out of the facts or events constituting the
defendant's criminal activities and shall include* but
not be limited to, the money equivalent of property
taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and
losses such as earnings and medical expenses;
(c) 'Restitution* means full, partial, or
nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a
victim, including insured damages;
(d) 'Victim* means any person whom the court
determines has suffered pecuniary damages..as a
result of the defendant's criminal activities;
"victim* shall not include any coparticipant in the
defendant's criminal activities.
(5) If a statute under which the defendant war
convicted .mandates that one of three stated
minimum terms must be imposed, the court shall
order imposition of the term of middle severity
unless there are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime. Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation ,
or to present additional facts. If the statement is in
writing, it shall be filed with the court and served
on the opposing party at least four days prior to the
time set for sentencing* In. determining whether
there are circumstances that justify imposition of
the highest of lowest term, the court may consider
the record in the case, the probation officer's
report, other report*, including reports received:
pursuant to section 76-3-404, and statements in
aggravation or mitigation submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence
introduced at the sentencing hearing.
(61 The court shall set forth on the record the
facts supporting and reasons for imposing the upper
or lower term.
(7) The court in* determining a just sentence shall
be guided by sentencing rules regarding aggravation
and mitigation promulgated by the Utah Judicial
Council.
(a> If a defendant subject to this section hat been
82

sentenced and committed to the Utah state prison ,
the court may, within 12Q days of the date of com*
mitment on its own morion, or at any time upon
the recommendation of the board of pardons, recall
the sentence and commitment previously ordered
and resentence the defendant in the same manner as
if he had not previously been sentenced, so long at
the new sentence is no greater than the initial
sentence. The resentencing provided for in this
section shall comply with the sentencing rules of the
Utah Judicial Council so as to eliminate disparity of
sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.
Credit shall be given for time served.
(9) The court shall state the reasons for its
sentence choice on the record at the time of sentencing. The court shall also inform the defendant as
part of the sentence that if the defendant is released
from prison, he or she may nonetheless be on
parole for a period of ten years.
(10) If during the commission of a crime
described as child kidnaping, rape of a child, object
rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual
abuse of a child, the actor causes substantial bodily
injury to the child, and if the charge is set forth in
the information or indictment and admitted by the
actor, or found true by a judge or jury at trial, the
actor shall, notwithstanding any other provision of
law, be sentenced to the aggravated mandatory term
in state prison.
i*4
76-3-201.1. Nonpayment of fine or restitution as
contempt • Imprisonment • Relief where defsuit not
contempt - Collection of default,
(1) When a defendant sentenced to pay a fine or
to make* restitution defaults in the payment thereof
or of any installment, the court on motion of the
county attorney, victim, or upon its own motion
may require him to show cavise why his default
should not be treated as contempt of court, and
may issue a show cause citation or a warrant of
arrest for his appearance.
(2) Unless the defendant shows that his default
was not attributable to an intentional refusal to
obey the order of the court or to a failure on his
part to make a good faith effort to make the
payment* the court may find tliat his default coast*
itutes contempt and may order him committed until
the fine or the restitution, or a specified part
thereof, is paid.
(3) When a fine or an order of restitution is
imposed on a corporation or unincorporated association, it is the duty of the person authorized to
make disbursement from the assets of the corporation or association to pay the fine or make the restitution from those assets* and his failure to do so
may be held to be contempt unless he makes the
showing required in subsection (2) of this section.
(4) The term of imprisonment for contempt for
nonpayment of fines or failure to make restitution
shall be set forth in the commitment order.
(5) If it appears to the satisfaction'of the court
that the default in the payment of a fine or restitution is not contempt, the court may enter an order
allowing the defendant additional time for payment,
reducing the amount thereof or of each installment
or revoking the fine or order of restitution or the
unpaid portion thereof in whole or in part.
A default in the payment of a fine or costs or
failure to make restitution or any installment
thereof may be collected by any means authorized
by law for the enforcement of a judgment. The
county attorney may collect restitution in behalf of
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judgment in accordance witlt Ru&'ZZ, utan Kuiet
of Criminal Procedure.: When* possible^ in" aH
offenses, involving; damage to persons- or- property,
the pre-sentence report of the defendant shall' be
made available to- the court prior to the pronounce*
TMS»7.Co*s
ment of judgment.
77-1*4. Flat M t paid - Coauaitarttat^
(6) After a hearing, the court may increase or
decrease the probation period; unless otherwise
77-18-r?Sos|>eiisioii o f sentence - Probation provided, by law, and may revoke or modify any
Period 4 * Sapervfeloa - Presentence investigation condition of probation. While on probation, and as
Comtittau - Restitatiov- Revocation;
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest or conviction a condition- of probation, the defendant may be
of any crime- or offense,, except in. the case of class* required to:
C misdemeanors, for which supervised probation by
(a) pay, in one or several sums, any fine
the Department of Corrections may not be imposed, imposed at the time of being placed on probation;
and if it appears compatible with the public interest,
(b) pay amounts required under provisions of
the court may suspend the imposition or execution Section 77«32a-l through 77-32a-14;
of sentence and place the defendant on probation
(c) provide for the support of others for whose
for a period of time it may determine, unless- support he is legally liable;
otherwise provided by law. The legal custody of all
(d) participate in available * rehabilitation
probationers referred to the Department of Correc- programs;
tions is vested in the court having jurisdiction and
(e) serve a period of time in the county jail not
the Department of Corrections. The legal custody of to exceed one year; OF
all unsupervised probationers is vested in the court
(f) serve a term of home confinement. The
having jurisdiction of the offender.
court may impose all or part of the cost* of super(2X&) The Department of Corrections shall vision as a condition of home confinement.
(7) Restitution shall be imposed unless upon a
establish presentence investigation and supervision
standard* for all individuals under its jurisdiction: hearing in court a finding is made that restitution is
These standards shall be based on the type of inappropriate under Subsection 76-3-201 (3Xb) or
offense and other criteria, including the demand for the defendant objects to its imposition under Subsservices and the available agency resources, which ection 76-3-201 (3Xc).
the Department of Corrections deems appropriate td
(&7 While on probation and as a condition of
determine what level of services shall be provided.
probation, the defendant shall be required to make
(b) Proposed' supervision and investigation restitution or reparation to the victim or victims as
standards- shall be submitted to the State Judicial defined in Subsection 76-3-201(4) for pecuniary
Council and Board of Pardons for review and damages, as provided in Section- 76-3-201 caused by
comment prior to adoption by the Department o£ the offense to which the defendant has pleaded
Corrections.
guilty, no contest, or for which a conviction was,
(3) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the had or by any other criminal conduct admitted by
Department of Corrections is not required to the defendant to the sentencing court, unless the
supervise the probation or parole of any person court in applying the criteria stated in Subsection 76*convicted of a class B or C misdemeanor but may, 3-201(3) finch that restitution is inappropriate. If
at the discretion of the Department of Corrections, the court determines that restitution is inappropriaand based upon adopted standards, accept a person te, the court shall state for the court record the
for supervision who is convicted of a class B misd- reasons for the decision.
emeanor.
(9) The prosecutor shall provide notice of the re(4) Prior to imposition of any sentence for an stitution order to the clerk of the court. The clerk
offense for which probation may: be granted* the shall place the order on the civil docket and shall
court may, with the concurrence of the defendant, provide notice of the order to the parties. The orde*
continue the date for the imposition of sentence for shall be treated as a legal judgment under which the
a reasonable period of time for the purpose of victim may seek civil remedy.
obtaining a pre-sentence report or information from
(10Xa) Upon completion-without violation of IS
other sources on the defendant. The report shall be months probation in felony or class A misdemeanor
prepared by the adult probation and parole section cases, or six months in class B misdemeanor cases,
of the Department of Corrections. The report shall the offender shall be terminated from sentence,
include a specific statement of pecuniary damages, unless the person is earlier terminated by the court.
accompanied by a recommendation from Adult
(b) The Department of Corrections shall notify
Probation and Parole regarding the payment of re- the- sentencing court in writing 30 days in advance
stitution by the defendant. The contents of. the in all cases where termination of supervision will
report shall be confidential* The court may disclose occur by law. The notification shall include a
all or parts, of the report to the defendant or his probation progress report and complete report of
counsel as the interest of justice requires. At the details on outstanding fines and restitution orders.
time of sentence, the court shall hear any testimony
(c) At any time prior to the termination of
or information the defendant or the prosecuting probation the court may, after a hearing with
attorney may wish to present concerning the appro- proper notice, upon its own motion or the motion
priate sentence. This testimony ot information* shall of the prosecutor, extend probation for good cause
be presented in open court on record and in the shown, for one additional term of 18 months in
presence of the defendant.
felony or class A misdemeanor cases or six months
(5) After a plea or verdict of guilty, or after a in class B misdemeanor cases. The reasons for the
verdict against the defendant on a plea of a former extension of the probation* period shall be made a
conviction or acquittal or once-in jeopardy, if the part of the court record.
judgment is not arrested or a new trial granted, the
(d) On a plea of guilty or no contest or convicboeaf of pardoat;
T7-\*4Si Jadfawat of deatft- Defeadaaf to select fWu«
saaadorletaftliajcctloe.
77»lf-tV Jadgpatar to pay fiat or rcsiitatioa coMthntes a
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crime *o*^ onenae or' » ocicnu«a^
jjjcsently serving' a-fexm of probation*,** the* courts
j ^ order that, the term of probation for the
original crime or offense commence again for the
full term(ilXa> All time served on probation by any
pffsoa without violation applies to service of the
jptai. term- of probation but does not preclude the
requirement of serving 18 months without violation
[0 felony* or class A misdemeanor cases, or six
months in dasa-B misdemeanor cases. Any time
speot by a person outside of confinement after
^insnission of a probation violation does not constitute service of the total term unless the person is
^aerated at a hearing to revoke the probation.
A0y time spent in confinement awaiting a hearing
or decision concerning revocation of probation does
a ot constitute service of the term of probation
except in the case of exoneration at the hearing, in
wbich case the time spent shall be included in
computing the total probation term.
(b) Whenever any probationer, without j
authority from the court or the Department of Co- j
rrcctkras* absents himself from the state, or avoids
or evades probation supervision, the period of
absence, avoidance, or evasion tolls the probation
period.
j
(c) Nothing in this section precludes the court
from discharging a probationer at any time, at the
discretion of the court.
(12X*) Probation- may not be revoked except
upon * hearing in court and a finding that the conditionsof probation have been violated*
(b) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with
particularity facts asserted to constitute violation of
the conditions of probation, the court which authorised probation shall determine whether the
affidavit establishes probable cause-to believe that
revocation or modification of probation may be justified.. If the court determines that there is
probable cause, it shall cause to be served on the
defendant a copy of the affidavit and an order to
show cause why his probation should not be
revoked or modified.
(c) The order to show cause shall specify a time
and place for the hearing, which shall be within
seven days of the service upon the defendant unless
he shows good cause for a continuance, and shall
inform the defendant of a right to be represented by
counsel at the hearing and to have counsel
appointed for him if he is indigent. The order shall
also inform the defendant of a right to present
evidence as provided in the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
(d) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or
deny the allegations of the affidavit. If the
defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the
allegations, which need not be evidence admissible
in a trial. The persons who have given adverse information on which the allegation* are based shall* be
presented as witnesses subject to questioning by the
defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise
orders. The defendant may call witnesses, appear
and speak in his own behalf, and present evidence.
(e) After hearing, the court shall make findings
of fact. Upon determining that the defendant
violated the conditions of probation, the court may
order the probation revoked, modified, or continued. If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be
sentenced or the sentence previously imposed shall
be executed.
*** u *
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ur felony and ciasr A misdemeanor cases or a sirmonth term in class B misdemeanor cases has been
completed without violation, but fine or restitution
orders are still outstanding, supervision by the Department of Corrections shall be terminated pursuant
to this section. In cfaua B misdemeanors where
probation supervision is not provided, the court
may order the Department of Corrections to
monitor the payment of any fine or restitution
ordered and give the court notice of the completion
of payment or the failure of the defendant to make
payment as ordered. The court may retain jurisdiction for the purposes of collecting he tines or restitution. In these cases, the court may order the Department of Social Services to enforce the collection,
and the Office of Recovery Services may withhold
the cost of collection from any recovered fine or
restitution.
(14) Restitution imposed under this chapter is
considered a debt for 'willful and malicious injury*
for purposes of exceptions listed to discharge in
bankruptcy as provided in Title 11, Section 523,
U.S.OA.
iw
77-18-2. Expattgement and seating of records.
(lXa) Any ]>erson who has been conykted of any
crime within this state may petition the convicting
court for a judicial pardon and for sealing of his
record in that court. At the time the petition is filled
and served upon the prosecuting attorney, the court
shall set a date for a hearing and notify the prosec*
uting attorney for the jurisdiction of the date set for
hearing. Any person who may have relevant information about the petitioner may testify at the
hearing; and the court, in its discretion, may request
a written evaluation of the adult parole and
probation section of the state Department of Corrections.
(b) If the court finds the petitioner for a period
of five years in the case of a class A misdemeanot
or felony, or for a period of three years in the case
of other misdemeanors or infractions, after his
release from incarceration, parole, or probation
whichever occurs last, has not been convicted of a
felony or of a misdemeanor involving moral
turpitude and that no proceeding involving such a
crime is pending or being instituted against the petitioner and further finds that the rehabilitation of
petitioner has been attained to the satisfaction of
the court, it shall enter an order that all records in
petitioner's case in the custody of that court ot in
the custody of any other court, agency or official be
sealed. The provisions of this subsection shall not
apply to violations for the operation of motor
vehicle under Title 41. The court shall also issue to
the petitioner a certificate stating the court's finding
that he has satisfied the court of his rehabilitation.
(2X&) In any case in which a person has been
arrested with or without a warrant, that individual
after 12 months, provided there have been no intervening arrests, may petition trie court in which the
proceeding occurred, orr if there were no court proceedings, any court in the jurisdiction where the
arrest occurred, for an order expunging any and all
records of arrest and detention which may have
been made, if any of the following occurred:
(i) He was released without the riling of
formal charges;
(ii) Proceedings against him were dismissed,
he was discharged without a conviction and no
charges were refiled against him within 30 days theUTAH ADVANCE REPORTS.
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^k> Upon rerinttt for ddfrerationv the jury may
take wittthenrtte "Mictions of the court and all
exhibits tad paP*" w«»ch have been received at
evidence, exce* depositions; and each juror may
also take with &* *W notes of the testimony or
other proceed ^ t a by himself, but none taken
by any other p* 5011 . .
0) When the case is finally submitted to the jury,
theyibsil be kept together in some convenient place
under charge of an officer until they agree upon a
verdict or are o^schtrged, unless otherwise ordered
(e) In afi *. the number of m e n * " o f » t n " by lit court- Except by order of the court, the
}uiy«haibi^fiediniectiem7«^^ officer havtfl them under his charge shall not allow
(D to a i l ' theproeecution ^ " 5 ? any communication to be made to them, or make
with the con of the teemed and *• *W™*£ any himself, except to ask them if they have agreed
the. court. WulatioB in writim" ™* ° " 2 upon their verdict, ind he shall not, before the
in open conroceed to trial * '""Jr* * : £ verdict iJ rendered, communicate to any person the
then ia pro with any nuffll* o f J" 0 "
smc of their deliberations or the verdict agreed
thanotbanriluiRd.
^ upon,
(D After «y ha. been imp**"* • • ***'
(m) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if
the trial shafted in the foUowio*01™7,
^ tbey desire to be informed on any point of law
me
(l)l»«eduabereadaw»ttepl«^
ansing in the cause, they shall inform the officer in
defendant sli
^ a n charge of them, who shall communicate such
© Tlwecmini attorney W J
request to the court The court may then direct that
openint at* and the defense W J ^ r t i ^ the jury be brought before the court where, in the
openini staior reserve it until the pw**"™ presence of the defendant and both counsel, the
hasitsia;
.**» in court shall respond to the inquiry or advise the jury
(3) Iteration shall off* • » * * m that no further iiistrucrions shall be given. Such
support of tire;
A ^ response shall be recorded. The court may in its
discretion respond to the incntiry in writing without
(4) Hie prosecution: h» -*1'
having the jury brought before the court, in which
defenstaiiittcaae?
. . * only case die inquiry and response thereto shall be
( » m the parties flay J °°* entered in the record.
rebuttmse*inless the court, for r
"^
(n) If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorrect
W*lMenceiscoi^^
on its face, it may be corrected by the jury under
other tppajme, the court snasr*
the advice of the court, or the jury may be sent out
again.
(0) At the coN^usion of the evidence by the prothe ariuaw»he1defen* secution, or at the conclusion of all of the evidence,
the court may issue an order dismissing any infor*
mation or indictment, or any count thereof, upon
the ground that the evidence is not legally sufficient
to establish the offense charged therein or any lesser
im
included offense.
7745-18. Rile If - Stitcttan of Jwy.
(a) The clerk shall draw by lot and call the
number of the jurors that are to try the cause phis
tJL BBfOf jurors rem- such an additional number at will allow for all per1
, j^dscharged and emptory challenges permitted. After each challenge
for cause sustained, another juror shall be called to
^t tfirt it is proper fill the vacancy before further challenges are made,
' h the offense and any such new juror may be challenged for
in which any cause. When the challenges for cause are compkteeV
order them to the clerk shall make a list of the jurors remauiing,
charge of an and each side, beginning with the prosecution, shall
town to them indicate thereon its peremptory challenge to one
for that juror at a time in regular turn, as the court may
while the direct, until ail peremptory challenges are exhausted
: fer no person or waived. The d o t shall then call the remaining
to speak to jurors, or so many of them as shall be necessary to*
"Jject coonected constitute the jury, in the order in which they
—2*AT I
t ^~\-.*A court without appear on the list, and the persons whose names are
with the tntl*retuij w
winecessan * t * * • . ,fc- :lirrtrm so called shall constitute the jury.
(b) The court may permit counsel or the
O J A t e ^ i ^ u ^ ^ ^
defendant to conduct the examination of the prosparepernutteaHiratef*^^
it is their ective jurors or may itself conduct the exaniination*
shall be v&**W ihat
or to In the latter event, the court may permit counsel ot
duty not to **se
be iddressed the defendant to supplement the examination by
converse witftt orfor
f the tnai,
by, any otto* P*\ 01 0 express an such further inquiry as it deems proper, or may
itself submit to the prospective jurors additional
or
and that a* "
submitted to
opinion the*0* w

bt^of ff^ftgtfance.
(c) AB tW « « , da,,* tried by j ^ J J
t i M « « ! * * « « « a jury* o p « c o u r t * » »
approval of* court and the coment of ** prwe"
cation..
, i^,
rf
(d> An of case, nan be tried with** » *•*
OBlm tte dWtant nuke, written d a n " " 1 « " ?
tea days pri» «U, or toe court « * » « ^ "
i t No j - O » b e tilowd in the trial <* " • * » •

CODE«CO

220

fi>NS,<

• * « * UTAH ADVANOt IEPOHT9.

-jobbing and shelter, if placed on probation;.
j defendant is snown to oe ircataui© «uu iaumm
(cVThe defendant lacks the ability to engage in exist for treatment of the offender in a probation
rational decision-making process regarding the status. Reports as specified by the trial judge shall
acceptance of mental treatment as demonstrated by be filed with the probation officer and the sentencgyidence of inability to weigh the possible costs and ing court. Failure to continue treatment or other
benefits of treatment;
condition of probation, except by agreement with
(dV There is no appropriate treatment alternat- the treating agency and the sentencing court, shall
ive to a court order of hospitalization; and
be a basis for the initiation of probation violation
(c}> The Utah state hospital or other suitable Ibearings. The period of probation shall not be for
facility can provide the defendant with treatment,. less than five years or until the expiration of the
e9tc9 and custody that is adequate and appropriate
defendant's sentence, whichever comet first, and
to the defendant's conditions and needs.
shall not be reduced by the sentencing court without
(5) When the defendant is not already under an consideration of a current report on* the mental
ofder of hospitalization at the time of the hearing, health status of the offender. Treatment or other
jjjc court shall order hospitalization, if appropriate, 1 care may be provided by an agency of the division
for * period not to exceed six months without of mental health, or with the approval of the sentebenefit of a review hearing. Hospitalization may be ncing court, or by any other mental health provider.
ordered at the Utah state hospital or other suitable A report shall be filed with the probation officer
facility as the, court deems appropriate. Upon such and the sentencing court every three months during
the period of probation. If a motion on a petition
f review hearing, to be commenced prior to the expiration of the previous order, an order for hospiti- to discontinue probation is made by the defendant,
lj2ation may be made for an indeterminate period if the probation officer shall request a report. A
fac court finds by clear and convincing evidence motion on a petition to discontinue probation shall
1*3
tint the required conditions of subsection (4) of this not be heard more than once every six months.
section will last for an indeterminate period.
(6) A defendant committed to the Utah state 77-35-22* Rule 22 - Sentence, judgment! and comHospital or other suitable facility for an indetermin- mitment.
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty
itc period shall be entitled to petition the sentencing
(oort for a rehearing at six month intervals, and the or plea of no contest, the court shall set a time for
confinement facility shall submit a report to the imposing sentence which shall be not less than two
nor more than 30 days after the verdict or plea,
sentencing court at twelve month invervals.
(7) The period of commitment to the Utah state unless the court, with the concurrence of the defenhospital or other suitable facility, as provided for in dant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court
^ section, shall in no circumstance be longer than may commit the defendant or may continue or alter
the maximum sentence imposed' 6y tne court.
f bai) or recognizance,,
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford
(8) When the Utah state hospital or other suitable
facility proposes to discharge a defendant prior to the defendant an opportunity to make a statement
the expiration of sentence, the institution shall in his own behalf and to present any information in
transmit to the board of pardons a report on the mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal
condition of the defendant which includes the cause why sentence should not be imposed. The
clinical facts, the diagnosis, the course of treatment, prosecuting attorney shall also be gives an opportand the prognosis for the remission of symptoms, unity to present any information material to the
the potential for recidivism and for the danger to imposition of sentence.
(b) On the same grounds: that a defendant may be
himself or the public, and recommendations for
future treatment. The board of pardons shall direct tried in his absence, he may likewise be sentenced in
that the defendant serve any or all of the unexpired his absence. If a defendant fails to appear for
term of the sentence at the Utah state prison, or sentence, a warrant for his arrest may be issued by
place the defendant on parole. In the event that the I the court.
board of pardons, pursuant to law or administrative t (c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilt/ or plea of no
rales, should consider for parole any defendant who contest, the court shall impose sentence and shall
his been adjudged guilty and mentally ill, the board 1 enter a judgment of conviction which shall include
shall consult with the treating facility or agency and the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence.
in additional report on the condition of the Following imposition of sentence, the court shall
defendant may be filed with the board* Pending I advise the defendant of his right to appeal and the
action of the board, the defendant shall remain at time within which any appeal shall be filed,
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the
the institution at which he is hospitalized. If the
defendant is placed on parole, treatment shall, upon court shall issue its commitment setting forth the
the recommendation of the hospital facility, be sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to the
made a condition of parole, and failure to continue jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the comtreatment or other condition of parole except by mitment to the jail or prison and shall make his
qnsement with the designated fadhtyaad the board f return on the commitment and file it with the court.
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a
of pardons shall be basis for initiating parole
violation hearings. The period of parole shall not be sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time.
iff*
for less than five yean or until the expiration of the
defendant's sentence, whichever comes first, and 77-35-23. Role 23 - Arrest of judgment.
thill not be reduced without consideration by the
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence,
board of pardons of a current report on the mental the court upon its own initiative may, or upon
health status of the offender.
motion of a defendant shall, arrest judgment if the
(9) If a defendant who pleads or is found guilty facts proved or admitted do not constitute a public
md mentally ill is placed on probation under the offense, or the defendant is mentally ill, or there is
jurisdiction of the sentencing court, the trial judge other good cause for the arrest of judgment. Upon
*aH make treatment a condition of probation if the arresting judgment the court may, unless a
**. w*
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entered or jeopardy has attached*, order a commitment until the defendant ischargetTaneW or retried,
or may enter any other order as may be just and
proper under the circumstances.
i*t*

I however, that dismissal b^corapronifs^ sfttUPnofW
granted when the misdemeanor is committeo^By^l
upon a peace officer while in th& performance ^
his duties, or riotously, or with an intent to comnjft
a felony.

77-35-26. Rule 26 - Appeals.
(a) An appeal is taken by filing with the clerk ^
the court from which the appeal is taken, a notice Q2
appeal stating the order or judgment appealed fro^
and by serving a copy: thereof upon the advent
party or his attorney of record. Proof of service ^
such copy shall be filed with the court.
(b) An appeal may be taken by the defendant:
(1) From the final judgment of convictions.
(2) From an order made, after judgment,
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant;
(3) From an interlocutory order whenr upo*
petition for review, the supreme court decides thaisuch an appeal would be in the interest of justice;
or
(4) From any order of the court judging the
defendant by reason of a mental disease or defect^
incompetent to proceed further in a pending prostN
cution.
(c) Ah appeal may be taken by the prosecutions
(1) From a final judgment of dismissal;
(2) From an order arresting judgment;
77-35-23. R*k 25 - I M i i t f I wUhort trial.
(3) From an order terminating the prosecution
(a) In its discretion, for substantial cause and in because of a finding of double jeopardy or deniwfurtherance of justice, the court may, either on its of a speedy trial;
own initiative or upon application of either party,
(4) From a judgment of the court holding *
order an information or indictment dismissed*
statute or any part thereof invalid; or
(b) The court shall dismiss the information or
(5) From an order of the court granting, a pre.
indictment when:
trial motion to suppress evidence when, upon*g
{\) There is unreasonable or unconstitutional \ petition for review, the supreme court decides that
delay in bringing defendant to trial;
such an appeal would be in the interest of justice.
(2) The allegations of the informationr or indie*
(dXl) All appeals in criminal cases shall be taken
tment, together with any bill of particulars [ within 30 days after the entry of the judgment
furnished in support thereof, do not constitute the appealed from, or, if a motion for a new trial or
offense intended to be charged in the pleading so arrest of judgment is made, within 30 days after
filed;
notice of the denial of the motion is given to the
(3) It appears that there was a substantial and defendant or his counsel. Proof of giving sudr
1
prejudicial defect in the impanelling or in the proc- notice shall be filed with the court,
eedings relating to the grand jury;
(2) No appeal shall be dismissed except for *
(4) The court is without jurisdiction; or ~
material defect in the taking thereof, or for failure
(5) The prosecution is barred by the statute of l to perfect the appeal, or upon motion of the appellimitations.
lant. The dismissal of the appeal affirms* the
(c) The reasons for any such dismissal shall be set judgment unless another appeal can be, and is,
forth in an order and entered in the minutes.
timely taken.
(d) If the dismissal is based upon the grounds
(e) Cases appealed in which the defendant ir
that there was unreasonable delay, or the court is | unable to post bond shall be given a preferred and
without jurisdiction, or the offense was not properly expeditious: setting in the appellate court.
alleged in the information or indictment, or there I
(0 Appeals'may be submitted on briefs and if an
was a defect in the impanelling or of the proceeds I appellant's brief is filed the appeal shall be decided
ngs relating to the grand jury, further prosecution | even though a party, upon due notice of the
for the offense shall not be barred and the court I
hearing, shall fail to appear for oral argument.
may make such orders with respect to the custody
(g) The rules of civil procedure relating to appealr
of the defendant pending the filing of new charges
as the interest of justice may require. Otherwise the shall govern criminal appeals to the supreme court
defendant shall be discharged and bail exonerated.
I except as otherwise provided.
An otder of dismissal based upon unconstitutlo- I (h) In capital cases where the sentence of death
nal delay in bringing the defendant to trial or based has been imposed, the case shall be automatically
upon the statute of limitations, shall be a bar to any reviewed by the supreme court within 60 days after
certification by the sentencing .court of. the entire
other prosecution for the offense charged.
(e) In misdemeanor cases, upon motion of the record unless the time is extended by the supreme
prosecutor, the court may dismiss the case if it is court for good cause. A case involving the sentence
compromised by the defendant and the injured of death shall have priority over all other cases*, in
party. The injured party shall first acknowledge the setting for hearing and in disposition,, by the
compromise before the court or in writing* The supreme court.
(i) The rules of practice for district and circuit
reasons for the order shall be set forth therein and
entered in the minutes. The order shall be a bar to courts promulgated by the judicial council; and
another prosecution for the same offense; provided approved by the supreme court relating to appeals

77-35-24. Rale 24 - Motkw for new trial.
. (a}. The court may, upon motion of a party or
upon its- own initiative, grant a new trial in the
interest of justice if there is any error or impropri- |
et> which had a substantial adverse effect upon the
rights of a pasty.
(bt A. motion for a new trial shall, be made in
writing and upon notice. The motion shall be acco*
mpanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential
facts in support of the motion. If additional time is
required to procure affidavits or evidence the court
may postpone the hearing on the motion for such
time as it deems reasonable.
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made within
10 days' after imposition of sentence, or within such
further time as the court may fix during the ten day
period.
(d) If a new trial is granted; the party shall be hi
the same position as if no trial had been held and
the former verdict shall not be used or mentioned I
either in evidence or in argument.
ittt
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THE STATE OF UTAH,
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY

-vs-

CRIMINAL NO.

8354

JOHN SHEPHERD DAVIS,
Defendant.
Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury:
Attached hereto are jury instructions, number 1 to number
2.S

» inclusive, as given by the Court in this case.

Dated this

^0 day of October, 1982.

DON V. TIBBS
DISTRICT JUDGE

*s* > ?^

•:K.riJ,fM,,CU:">
^
K' : " •

TY,

Plaintiff,

i '

C. Howard Watkin, Court Reporter
Carole B. MelTor, Clerk for hearing

In the Fourth Judicial District Court
of the State of Utah
In and For Utah County
THE STATE OF UTAH,

x

„.„„«« wim****

MINUTE ENTKT

Plaintiff

CASE N U M B E R
DATED

8354

November 26, 1982

JOHN SHEPHARD DAVIS,
Defendant

1

DON V. TIBBS
JUDGE
Noall T. Wootton-Steve Kill pack, for State
Ronald Stanger, for Defendant
This matter comes before the Court at this time for Sentencing. A Motion for
a New Trial and Motion for Arrested Judgment has been filed by the Defendant.
Mr. Ronald Stanger addressed the Court and stated in his arguments on the
Motion that the State's case was improperly charged. Upon hearing arguments
in this matter the Motion for New Trial and Arrested Judgment is Denied. Court
feels matters brought out in the Motion were in harmless error (regarding
points set forth in Motion—1 thru 6. It is an improper basis to set aside
Judgment.
At this time the State of Utah will be heard regarding recommendations for
Defendant Davis. Mr. Wootton made his recommendations, followed by Deputy
Steve Killpack. Mr. Wootton-in his recommendations stated his office took
the position that the statutory sentence should be carried, out, i.e., Six
months time in the County Jail and probation after that period of time. He
stated that attorneys have a great duty to the general public and if they are
derelict in their duties it casts a shadow on the entire legal profession.
He stated any fine should go toward restitution and he could work that out in
public service. Mr. Killpack, in his statements, addressed his remarks towards
a particular letter sent to the Court by one of the services in Utah County.
Mr. Killpack had same recommendations for sentencing as did the County Attorney.
Mr. Dean Hansen A. P. and P. officer, stated in his conversation with some of
the jurors-some of them felt they were not sure they had made the right decision
in finding the Defendant guilty
Defense Attorney Stanger then addressed the Court regarding recommendations. He
stated the case had been very traumatic for him as a lawyer. He said that
any restitution in the case should be as set forth in the civil action now pending,
Sentencing should be in public service and not in jail or prison time.

nappy witn nis services ana a n e r client naa oeen enricned trom his services
then he filed his action against him—-the defendant.
Mr. Wootton then re-addressed the Court, mentioning othersimilar cases.
Court at this time stated his sorry to the Defendant and his family and that
the recommendations and letters to the Court regarding Mr. Davis had been the
most supportive and the best recommendations he had ever received on any action.
Defendant sentenced this time as follows: Term in the Utah State Prison not
to exceed five years, fined $5,000.00. Fine and prison sentence stayed and the
Defendant is placed on probation for 2 years. Defendant is to work for the
Utah County Sanity Administration one day a week for 50 weeks, with no charge
to Utah County or to the State of Utah. Restitution shall be as determined in
the Civil law suit re: Charley Joseph and Joseph Mascaro. Defendant is on
stiff probation for two years and is not to use liquor, drugs, or make any
violation of the law during that period. Crime charged "theft by deception"
is reduced to a Third Degree Felony", Work arrangements shall be arranged throag<
il
the Sanity Administration! by way of the Adult Probation and Parole Office.
Court is in recess.
1 C

NOALL T. WOOTTON
Utah County Attorney
Room 107, County Building
Provo, Utah 84601
373-5510 Ext. 320
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:
:

STIPULATION AND ORDER

:
Case No. 8354

JOHN S. DAVIS,
Defendant.

1.

:
:

Plaintiff and Defendant hereby stipulate that the

Defendant's probation may be extended to April 1, 19 85, in order
to allow Defendant additional time to file motions and to comply
with the Court's prior order of probation.
2.

The Defendant has represented that he intends to move

for a new trial by written motion in the near future.

Additional

time will be required for the State to respond to such motion.
3.

The Department of Adult Probation and Parole have

recommended that the Court further consider the assessment of
restitution as a condition of the Defendant's probation at a
hearing where the victims are represented.

Mr. Joe Tesch, attorney

for said victims will be unavailable to appear at such hearing until

after November 15, 1984.
4.

Defendant waives his right to be present at a hearing

extending his probation to April 1, 19 85, and stipulates that the
Court may proceed in his absence to set a date and time for further
review of his probation at any time convenient to the Court's
schedule in Manti between December 1, 19 84, and April 1, 19 85.
DATED this

2&

day of

'^^Am

^fetft^fe^W

_^__^
Jpttn D a v i s ,

_^£^_
Defendant

Steven B. Ki!
Deputy County Attorney

O R D E R
The above entitled matter having come before the Court by
Stipulation of the parties, and good cause appearing, and the
Court having consulted with the Department of Adult Probation and
Parole, and being fully advised in the premises, hereby makes and
enters the following:
ORDER
1.

Defendant's probation is extended to April 1, 19 85.

2.

Any motions Defendant intends to have considered by the

Court at the next scheduled hearing to be set between December 1,
19 84, and April 1, 19 85, in Manti, shall be filed in writing on
-2-

or before November 10, 19 84, and the State is ordered to respond
within ten working days of their receipt of such motions.
3.

The Department of Adult Probation and Parole is ordered

to contact the clerk of the Court in Manti and set a date and
time for a hearing to review the status of the Defendant's probation
between December 1, 1984 and April 1, 1985, and to notify the
parties of such hearing date, and to request that Mr. Joe Tesch,
attorney for the victims in this case, also appear at such hearing
to advise the Court regarding the status of the civil proceedings.
DATED this

/3 day of

AJo4f>M

^<

, 1984.

J
v
H*~
Don V. Tibbs, Judge
Approved as to Form
O
Richard Lindsay
Department of Adult Probation & Parole
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

C
00OO00

Regular May Term, 1984

June 25, 1984

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

REMITTITUR
No. 18892
District No. 8354

v.
John Shepard Davis.
Defendant and Appellant.

This cause having been heretofore argued and submitted,
and the Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, it is now
ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the district court
herein be, and the same is, affirmed.

Regular May Term, 1984

October 2, 1984

Upon consideration of the petition for rehearing
heretofore filed herein, and the arguments of counsel thereupon had,
it is ordered that the rehearing be, and the same is, denied.

Issued:

November 21, 1984

Record:

3 Volumes
1 Envelope

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
00O00

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v»
John Shepard Davis,
Defendant and Appellant.

No. 18892
F I L E D
June 25, 1984
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

HALL, Chief Justice:
This-is an appeal from a third degree felony conviction of theft.
Defendant assigns the following as error:
(1)' insufficiency of the evidence; (2) denial of his motion to
waive a jury trial; (3) admission of improper evidence during
the State's rebuttal argument; and (4) inclusion of a partial
written deposition in the evidence which the jury was permitted
to take with them into their place of deliberation.
In 1978, Joseph Mascaro and Charley Joseph became
investment partners, for the purpose of purchasing options on two
adjacent parcels of real property located in Utah County. While
holding said options, Mascaro and Joseph (hereinafter the
"partnership") initiated a sale of both parcels to Paul Tanner,
who intended to develop the lots into a subdivision. Prior to
the consummation of that sale, however, the term of the options
expired and Tanner was able to negotiate a direct purchase on
the larger of the two parcels (consisting of approximately 130
acres) from Stan Logan, the former owner thereof. The partnership was able to renew its option on the smaller 18-acre parcel,
which it then exercised by purchasing the said parcel on uniform
real estate contract for $117,000. Inasmuch as this smaller
parcel provided access to the larger parcel purchased by Tanner,
it was essential to Tanner's proposed development. Tanner
therefore purchased the smaller parcel from the partnership on
uniform real estate contract at a price of $165,000. He paid
$40,000 down on the contract, but was unable thereafter to
obtain the necessary financing to pay off the $125,000 balance.
In December of 1978, defendant John Davis, an attorney, was hired by the partnership to collect the balance owing
~.
In violation of U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6-404.
2. The $40,000 received from Tanner was disbursed by the
partnership as follows: $33,000 was paid as a down payment on
the partnership's contract to purchase the 18-acre parcel;
$4,000 was paid to the real estate company handling the transaction; and the remaining $3,000 was split equally between
Mascaro and Joseph.

on the Tanner contract. During the initial meeting between
defendant and the partnership, one of the matters discussed
relative to the impending collection was that of attorney
fees. Defendant indicated that his fee for the requested
services would be between $9,000 and $12,000, depending upon the
extent of the work involved. The partnership, however, countered with an offer of a flat fee of $20,000 to cover the
collection as well as defendant's representation of the partnership in any connected litigation. The record does not reveal
which fee proposal was ultimately agreed upon.
Defendant was successful in negotiating a settlement
between the partnership and Tanner, whereby Tanner agreed to
sell his interest in both parcels if the partnership could find
another buyer before Tanner could obtain financing. This
settlement agreement was reduced to writing and signed by the
parties (i.e., Mascaro, Joseph and Tanner) on February 8, 1979.
Soon thereafter, defendant was commissioned by the partnership
to .effectuate the resale of the property. According to the
testimony of Charley Joseph, defendant was to be paid an additional $20,000 if he was successful in finding a new buyer and
completing the resale transaction. That testimony was however
contradicted by defendant, who testified that he had agreed to
perform the said services in exchange for one-third of the total
income derived from the transaction. The record does not contain any written documentation evidencing the parties' intentions with respect to attorney fees.
Less than a month and a half after the signing of the
settlement agreement, defendant succeeded in negotiating a new
sale of the subject property (both parcels) to Chatillion, Inc.
(hereinafter "Chatillion") at a total price of $1,280,000.
Since the said property consisted of two distinct parcels owned
by different individuals (i.e., a 130-acre parcel owned by Stan
Logan and an 18-acre parcel owned by the partnership), the sale
was accomplished by executing a separate earnest money agreement between Chatillion and each of the owners. The agreement
relevant to these proceedings is that between Chatillion and
the partnership concerning the 18-acre parcel. That agreement
provided that Chatillion would pay the partnership approximately
$141,000 in cash and transfer to it property valued at $240,000.
A closing was held on June 5, 1979, at which time
Curtis Baum, Chatillion's principal officer and stockholder,
tendered to the partnership a check for $100,000, as well as
the deeds to eight building lots. The check was made payable
to defendant in his capacity as attorney for the partnership
and was deposited by defendant in his trust account, as per the
directions of Charley Joseph. The building, lots were rejected
by the partnership because they were of insufficient value. As
Tl The cash balance of $41,000 was to be paid within the
following week. As will be shown infra, said payment was made
in full, though perhaps not within the week after the closing.

a result, Baum tendered deeds to another eight lots, but failed
to deliver therewith an appraisal to substantiate their value.
At trial Joseph testified that at the time the initial
funds were received from Chatillion and deposited, he gave defendant specific instructions regarding the disbursement thereof. Those instructions were as follows: (1) Joseph was to
receive, and did receive on that particular occasion, a check
for $20,000 to cover his expenses; (2) $30,000 to $40,000 was
to be applied toward the partnership's purchase of the 18-acre
parcel from Shelby Taylor (original owner of the said parcel);
(3) $25,000 to $30,000 was to be disbursed to Joseph Mascaro as
his partnership share; and (4) an unspecified amount was to be
reserved to cover closing expenses.
Also testifying in regard to the disbursement instructions was Curtis Baum, who claimed to have been present at the
time the $100,000 was deposited by defendant and to have been
privy to the conversations between defendant and Joseph concerning the appropriation of that money. His recollection of
the instructions given defendant was identical to that given by
Joseph (in his trial testimony), with only one exception: he
thought he recalled the amount set aside for Mascaro as being
$20,000 to $25,000, rather than $25,000 to $30,000.
Another witness who claimed to have been privy to the
subject conversation between defendant and Joseph was George
Robinson, an employee of the defendant's on the occasion so
specified. Robinson's testimony in this respect was consistent
with Joseph's in nearly every respect, the only variation being
that he did not recall a specific dollar amount committed to
Shelby Taylor; rather, he thought the instruction with respect
to the Taylor obligation was that an unspecified amount (of the
deposited funds) should be used to make a down payment on an
apartment complex that would then be conveyed to Taylor in
satisfaction of the partnership's obligation to him.
Defendant's version of the instructions given him as
to the disbursement of the $100,000 was at variance with that
adduced by the plaintiff through the testimonies of Joseph,
Baum and Robinson, supra. He testified that Joseph's instructions were to apply the funds toward the retainer (i.e., allegedly a one-third contingency fee) and use them as needed at
his (defendant's) own discretion.
Bank records produced at trial revealed that on June 5,
1979, prior to the recording of the $100,000 deposit, defendant's trust account registered an overdraft of $14.23. On
June 18, 1979, less than two weeks after the said deposit was
made, defendant's trust account registered an overdraft of
$435.67. During that two-week period, only $25,903.64 from
defendant's trust account was expended in connection with his
4. Appraisals were to be delivered within a few days.
record does not show whether said delivery took place.

The

work for the partnership;
personal expenses.

the balance was spent on defendant's

Over the period between June 25, 1979, and September 12,
1979, defendant received and deposited in his trust account on
behalf of the partnership additional payments from Chatillion
totalling $41,037.09. Of this amount only $21,854 was expended
in connection with business of the partnership.
Thus, of the
total $141,037.09 received from Chatillion and deposited into
defendant's trust account, only $47,757.64 was spent in furtherance of ..partnership business, leaving a difference of
$93,279.45.
Despite Chatillion's satisfaction of the cash obligation on the 18-acre purchase, the sale of that parcel was
never fully consummated because an agreement was never reached
in respect to the value of the lots tendered by Chatillion.
5. ' The $25,903.64 figure was calculated on the basis of the
following stipulated expenditures: (1) a $20,000 payment to
Charley Joseph; (2) a $903.64 payment to Bitner Excavating in
satisfaction of a debt owed by Joseph; and (3) a $5,000 payment
to defendant's employee, George Robinson, for work done for the
partnership.
6. The parties further stipulated that defendant's personal
expenditures from the $100,000 included, inter alia, the
following: (1) payment of $1,753.27 to Jones Paint & Glass for
installation of a window at defendant's residence; (2) payment
of $26,644.23 to Thorn, Inc., for accounts previously collected
on behalf of Thorn, Inc.; (3) payment of $6,920 to L. Flake
Rogers for back rent on defendant's office; (4) payment of
$4,183.20 to Deseret Federal Savings for payments in arrears on
defendant's home; (5) payment of $3,119.70 to M. Dayle Jeffs,
an attorney, in settlement of a 1977 default judgment against
defendant for unpaid credit card debts; (6) payment of $9,125
to F.M.A. Leasing for the lease of a 1974 vehicle and a
Burroughs computer; (7) payment of $4,713.75 to Burroughs
Corporation for updating the memory of defendant's computer;
(8) payment of $6,530 to Provo 27th Ward as a charitable contribution; (9) payment of $1,432.46 to Meredith & Day on a
student loan debt; (10) payment of $2,392.72 to Service Station
Supply, Inc., for accounts collected on its behalf; and (11)
payment of $1,325.81 to Utah Office Supply for accounts
collected on its behalf.
7. It was stipulated that the $21,854 was spent as follows:
(1) $18,000 was paid to Charley Joseph; (2) $2,500 was paid to
George Robinson for work he performed for the partnership;
(3) $1,000 was paid to Mountainland Realty; (4) $350 was paid
to Aspen Engineering; and (5) $4 was paid to the Salt Lake
County Recorder.
8. The State acknowledged defendant's possible entitlement to
a $20,000 fee pursuant to the flat fee arrangement described at
trial by Joseph and, therefore, charged defendant with the
theft of only $73,279.45 rather than the full $93,279.45.

Also contributing to the failure to bring the sale to completion was the dispute that arose between the partners, Mascaro
and Joseph, in November, 1979. The apparent cause of that dispute was that Mascaro had never received his share of the money
paid by Chatillion. As a result, Mascaro, along with Shelby
Taylor, who likewise had never received a payment out of the
said funds, obtained other counsel and in May of 1980 brought
suit to recover the sums allegedly owed them, naming as defendants Charley Joseph, Chatillion, Inc. (Baum), and the defendant herein, John Davis. Defendant represented himself and
Joseph in that action. However, he did not file an answer to
the complaint, and consequently a default judgment was entered
against them. He then succeeded in getting the judgment set
aside and _was ordered to respond to the complaint within thirty
days. Again, he failed to respond, and a second default judgment was entered. The trial court subsequently ordered defendant to withdraw as counsel because he was to be called as a
witness by the plaintiffs (Mascaro and Brown).
On June 18, 1981, after the second default judgment
had been entered against Davis (defendant) and Charley Joseph,
Joseph Rust, attorney for plaintiffs Taylor and Mascaro, deposed
defendant in connection with the continuing litigation between
Rust's clients and Chatillion. At that deposition, defendant
represented that he was still holding the monies received from
Chatillion in his trust account, but refused to reveal the
location of the trust account.
After the deposition, Charley
Joseph, who had been present and had heard defendant make the
foregoing representation, inquired of defendant as to where he
was holding the money. Defendant purportedly replied that he
had the money but did not have to tell anyone where it was.
Joseph subsequently filed a cross-claim against
defendant and, at the suggestion of counsel, also filed criminal
charges against him for theft. Defendant declined to answer the
cross-claim because, as he later explained at trial, he did not
want to prejudice his case in the present criminal matter. Consequently, Joseph obtained a default judgment against defendant
in the amount of $180,000.
Attorney Rust petitioned the trial court for an order
to require defendant to disclose information concerning his
trust account. Several hearings were held on this matter, and
finally an order was issued that defendant make full disclosure.
As a result, defendant's bank records were obtained and it was
discovered, contrary to what defendant had represented, that
the funds received from Chatillion had been fully exhausted.
As heretofore indicated, the records also revealed that the
funds had been spent primarily in satisfaction of defendant's
personal expenses.
W~. That defendant made this representation was verified at
trial by Joseph Rust, Charley Joseph and Brad Young (the court
reporter who transcribed the deposition), all of whom were
present at the June 18, 1981 deposition of defendant.
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The instant matter proceeded to trial on October 18,
1982. Defendant had made a motion before trial to waive his
right to a jury trial, but his motion had been denied on the
basis of a prosecution objection. The case was therefore tried
before a jury, and defendant was found guilty of theft.
I.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Defendant contends that the evidence presented at
trial was insufficient to support his conviction of theft.
Under familiar rules of appellate review, we are constrained to
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's
verdict and will only interfere with or overturn the verdict
when the evidence is so lacking and insubstantial that a reasonable man could noi^possibly have reached a verdict beyond a
reasonable doubt.
To sustain a conviction of theft, the evidence must
establish the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) that the defendant obtained or exercised unlawful control
over the-nroperty of another (2) with a purpose to deprive him
thereof.
The underlying premise to defendant's claim of insufficiency of the evidence is the belief that his testimony provided the only reasonable and truthful account of the events
and circumstances precipitating this action and therefore all
conflicting evidence should have been disbelieved and disregarded by the jury. Overlooked in this premise is the fundamental rule that the prerogative to judge the credibility of
witnesses and evidence in general belongs to the jury. In
State v. Shonka,
where the appellant made a claim similar to
that made herein by defendant, this Court observed:
10. Defendant was sentenced to not more than five years in
the Utah State Prison and fined $5,000. Both the sentence and
fine were stayed, however, and defendant was placed on two
years1 probation on condition that he work one day a week for
fifty weeks for the Utah County Sanity Administration and that
he make restitution to the victims in the amount determined by
the civil lawsuit on the same matter. Defendant's conviction,
although originally a second degree felony, was reduced at
sentencing to a third degree felony.
11. See State v. Jones, Utah, 657 P.2d 1263 (1982); State v.
Forsyth, Utah, 641 P.2d 1172 (1982); State v. Asay, Utah, 631
P.2d 861 (1981).
12. U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6-404. It is noted that in order for
a theft conviction to be punishable as a second degree felony
(as this one was), the requirements of § 76-6-412 must also be
satisfied. The latter section was satisfied in this case by
the parties1 stipulation that the value of the property alleged
to have been stolen exceeded $1,000.
13. 3 Utah 2d 124, 279 P.2d 711 (1955).
No. 18892

-6-

What the defense argument overlooks is that
the jury was not absolutely bound to believe all of the testimony of the defendant.
It was their prerogative to give it only
such weight as they thought it entitled to
considered in the light of all of the facts
and circumstances surrounding the occurrence, including the self-interest of the
witness.
To establish the first element of the offense, plaintiff had to show (1) that the money received from Chatillion
actually belonged to the partnership, and (2) that defendant
obtained or exercised unlawful control over that money.
As proof that the money belonged to the partnership,
plaintiff offered the following evidence: Curtis Baum's testimony indicating his intention to pay the partnership with the
money tendered to defendant and his perception of defendant's
role with respect to the money as that of a mere conduit or
intermediary; the check for $100,000 evidencing defendant's
representative capacity by the fact that it was made payable to
defendant not in a personal capacity, but rather as attorney
for the partnership; and the testimony of both Joseph and the
defendant to the effect that the money was deposited in
defendant's account at Joseph's direction.
To prove the second half of this element (i.e., the
exercise of unlawful control), plaintiff established first,
through the testimony of Charley Joseph, Curtis Baum and George
Robinson, that defendant received explicit instructions from
Joseph to disburse the money received from Chatillion in the
payment of partnership expenses. Plaintiff then showed that of
the $141,037.09 ultimately received from Chatillion, only
$47,754.64 was disbursed as directed (i.e., on behalf of partnership expenses), while $93,279.45 was disbursed to satisfy
defendant's personal obligations. Furthermore, plaintiff
pointed out that while $20,000 of the $93,279.45 consumed by
defendant was actually owed defendant by the partnership in
attorney fees, defendant had only received authorization to
take $6,000 toward his fee from the total received from
Chatillion. As to the additional $20,000 offered defendant for
arranging and transacting a new sale after the Tanner default,
plaintiff pointed out that the sale had never been fully consummated and therefore the fee was not owing.
The only evidence offered by defendant to controvert
plaintiff's proof on this first element of the offense was his
own testimony relative to the agreement for attorney fees
and the instructions for the disbursement of the money received
from Chatillion. As heretofore indicated, defendant testified
that he was to receive a one-third contingency fee for his
14.

Id. at 714.
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services subsequent to the Tanner default. Inasmuch as the
sale to Chatillion was worth approximately $381,000 to the
partnership, defendant claimed that his portion was in excess
of $100,000. He further claimed that the partners had agreed
to take as their portion the real property traded by Chatillion
(valued at $240,000). Thus, he maintained that the $100,000
received from Chatillion actually belonged to him.
Even had the jury accepted defendant's representation
as to the fee arrangement, they would not have been justified
in concluding that his appropriation of the money received from
Chatillion as his fee was proper because, as plaintiff pointed
out, defendant never consummated the services for which he was
to receive the alleged contingency fee.
Defendant further testified that the instructions he
received from Joseph relative to the disbursement of the money
were that it should be applied toward defendant's retainer and
used at his own discretion. Based on those instructions, he
claimed that his expenditures were justified and did not constitute an exercise of unauthorized control.
Viewing the foregoing evidence in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, we believe reasonable minds could
believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the cash paid by
Chatillion belonged to the partnership and that defendant's
disbursement of that cash to himself for his own purposes constituted unauthorized control.
As to the second element of the offense, to wit:
intent to deprive, it is well-settled that such need not be
proved by direct evidence, but may be inferred from the defendant's acts, conduct, statements or from the circumstances.
According to plaintiff, the most salient evidence in this regard
is as follows: Defendant twice failed to enter responsive
pleadings in the civil action brought against himself, Joseph
and Chatillion by Taylor and Mascaro, apparently to avoid being
compelled to give an accounting of the money deposited in his
trust account. Furthermore, he subsequently represented under
oath at the June 18, 1981 deposition that he was still holding
the money in his trust account, although bank records established that he had in fact expended the money nearly a full
year earlier. Plaintiff contends that this evidence, combined
with that set forth above relative to defendant's appropriation
of the money, establishes beyond a reasonable doubt defendant's
"intent to deprive."
Again, defendant urges that his testimony at trial
that he honestly believed he was entitled to the money as his
fee was sufficient to negate plaintiff's evidence (above)
respecting the element of intent. The jury, however, whose
JdZ State v. Murphy, Utah, 674 P.2d 1220 (1983); State v.
Kennedy, Utah, 616 P.2d 594 (1980).
»•»-
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prerogative it is to weigh such evidence, did not countenance
defendant's position, and neither do we.
This is not the first time this Court has found
"intent to deprive" under circumstances such as are existing
here. In State v. Shonka, supra, this Court ruled that the
evidence that defendant admitted taking the money, failed to
record it or report it to her supervisors, failed to disburse
it in the proper manner, and refused to permit an audit of her
personal accounts was sufficient to support the jury's finding
of intent to steal. By comparison, in the instant matter,
defendant admittedly appropriated most of the money for his own
use, failed to report such appropriation to the partnership,
failed to follow the disbursement instructions given him by
Joseph and avoided revealing the location of his trust account
and the nature of the expenditures. We hold, as did the Court
in Shonka, that the evidence so stated constitutes a sufficient
factual foundation from which reasonable minds could infer that
defendant took the money with the intent to deprive the
partnership thereof.
II.

RIGHT TO WAIVE A JURY TRIAL

Defendant's second assignment of error is in respect
to the trial court's denial of his motion to waive a jury
trial. He claims that the court's ruling in this regard abrogated his constitutional right to an impartial trial.
We do
not agree.
We addressed theginstant issue most recently in the
case of State v. Studham.
We determined therein that the
trial court had not erred in denying the defendant's motion to
waive his jury right. The rationale applied in reaching that
determination is dispositive here:
Although an accused is guaranteed a right
of trial by jury, neither the state nor the
federal constitution guarantees him a right
to "waive" a jury trial. On the contrary,
Federal Rule 23(a), Criminal Procedure, and
its-counterpart, U.C.A., 1953, § 77-3517,
both allow such waiver only by the
16. Supra note 13, at 714.
17. Pursuant to the guarantees set forth in Article I,
Section 12 of the Utah Constitution, to wit:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right . . . to have a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury of the
county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed . . . .
18. Utah, 655 P.2d 669 (1982).
19. This section provides, in pertinent part:
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by
jury unless the defendant waives a jury in
open court with the approval of the court
and the consent of the prosecution.

court's approval and the consent of the
prosecution.
In the instant case, neither the court nor the prosecution consented to the proposed waiver. Furthermore, the
record is devoid of any indication that defendant was denied a
fair trial as a result of the case being tried to a jury. We
therefore hold that the trial court's denial of the requested
waiver did not interfere with defendant's constitutional rights.
III.

REBUTTAL EVIDENCE

Defendant next assigns error in the admission of a
written excerpt of his June 18, 1981 deposition as rebuttal
evidence. The circumstances out of which this alleged error
arose are set forth hereafter.
During the presentation of its case-in-chief, plaintiff called upon Charley Joseph to testify concerning a response
given by defendant at his June 18, 1981 deposition (to which
Joseph had been privy) to the question as to whether defendant
still had the money received from Chatillion in his trust
account and, if so, where that account was located. Defendant's
response to that question, as Joseph recalls it, was that the
money was still in the account, but that he did not have to
reveal the location of the account or anything further concerning it.
At that point in the trial proceedings, plaintiff
moved to have the corresponding portion of the written deposition admitted into evidence as an exhibit. The trial court,
however, expressed its view that such an admission would be
duplicative in light of Joseph's testimony; whereupon, defendant
made an objection to that effect which was sustained.
During plaintiff's subsequent cross-examination of
defendant, defendant was asked to verify his deposition statement. His initial response was that he did not recall being
asked the question or having answered it as Joseph had represented. After being shown the deposition to refresh his memory,
he then claimed that he had misunderstood the question at the
time it was asked (i.e., June 18, 1981) and that his answer hadbeen clarified at a later deposition taken in September, 1981.
20. Supra note 18, at 671. See also State v. Black, Utah,
551 P.2d 518, 520 (1976); Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24
(1965).
21. The portion of the September 23, 1981 deposition that
purportedly clarified the response in the earlier June deposition was read into the record as follows:
Q. Am I to understand that you did not
understand the question at that time?
A. Well, apparently not. I have since
answered as required by the Court. I
answered regarding the trust account at
that time and I indicated that the trust
account had been closed out.

Considering defendant's statements on cross-examination with regard to the status of the trust account at the time
the June deposition was taken inconsistent with his representations in that same regard in the deposition, plaintiff called
Brad Young, the court reporter who took the June deposition, as
a rebuttal witness. Young verified the accuracy of the deposition and added his independent recollection of defendant's
statement. At that point, plaintiff again moved to have the
written excerpt from the deposition containing defendant's
statement admitted as an exhibit corroborating Young's rebuttal
testimony. Defendant interposed an objection to its admission
on grounds that it did not constitute a prior inconsistent
statement. The court ruled that it was the equivalent of a
prior inconsistent statement and could be admitted as "an initial question of fact for the jury to determine." Defendant
made no further objection, and the evidence was admitted as
Exhibit P-l.
Defendant contends on appeal that evidence that goes
to "an initial question of fact" can only be presented as part
of the case-in-chief. He did not, however, base his objection
to the admission of Exhibit P-l on those same grounds at trial.
Rather, his objection there was limited to the exhibit's admission as a prior inconsistent statement, which basis he apparently
abandons on appeal. Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Evidence
provides:
A verdict or finding shall not be set
aside, nor shall the judgment or decision
based thereon be reversed, by reason of the
erroneous admission of evidence unless (a)
there appears of record objection to the
evidence timely interposed and so stated as
to make clear the specific ground or objection • • • •
(Emphasis added.) In light of this rule, we hold that defendant's present assertion of error in respect to the admission
of Exhibit P-l is precluded.
IV.

THE USE OF DEPOSITIONS IN JURY DELIBERATIONS

Defendant's final assignment of error is in respect
to the trial court's permitting the jury to take Exhibit P-l (a
partial deposition) with them into their place of deliberation.
He argues that in so doing, the court violated Rule 17 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (U.C.A., 1953, § 77-35-17(k))
which provides in pertinent part:
(k) Upon retiring for deliberation,
the jury may take with them the instructions of the court and all exhibits and
papers which have been received as
evidence, except depositions; and each
-11-
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juror may also take with him any notes of
the testimony or other proceedings taken
by himself, but none taken by any other
person.
(Emphasis added.)
Plaintiff's rejoinder to this argument is that there
is nothing in the record that even suggests that Exhibit P-l
went with the jury into deliberation and therefore the defendant has failed in his burden of showing error.
In the absence of any indication in the record to the
contrary, we assume that all evidentiary exhibits were sent with
the jury into deliberation. Such an assumption is appropriate
here. We therefore conclude that error was committed as
assigned by defendant.
Our conclusion in this regard comports with decisional
law in this as well as other jurisdictions. In State v.
Solomon,
this Court held that it was error to permit a portion of a witness's transcript to be taken to the jury room,
reasoning as follows:
It is evident therefore that under the
statutes such written testimony is not to
be read by the jury in the jury room but
is to be read to them in open court, subject to all objections to be made, the
same as if the witness were present and
testifying. The written record thereof
should not be taken to the jury room where
the jury might read it. A written instrument, made an exhibit in the cause but not
consisting of testimony of a witness in
the case, may of course be taken to the
jury room the same as maps, diagrams, and
other exhibits. But the testimony of a
witness is in a different category. Such
is the provision of the statutes and the
common law always excluded depositions and
written testimony from being carried from
the bar by the jury. We can see no reason
why the court should depart from the well
established rule. It may often happen
that the testimony on one side is oral
from witnesses produced before the jury,
while the testimony for the other side on
~ZT. 96 Utah 500, 87 P.2d 807 (1939). See also State v~.
Wilson, 188 Kan. 67, 360 P.2d 1092 (1961); State v. Payne, 199
Wis. 615, 227 N.W. 258 (1929); Shedden v. Stiles, 121 Ga. 637,
49 S.E. 719 (1905).
No. 18892
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essential matters is in the form of depositions or in the transcript from testimony at a previous hearing• If the hearing
lasts for any length of time and the jury
takes the depositions or transcript to be
read and discussed while the oral evidence
contra has in a measure faded from the
memory of the jurors, it is obvious that
the side sustained by written evidence is
given an undue advantage* The law does
not permit depositions or witnesses to go
to the jury room.
While we are convinced of the commission of the
asserted error, we are unable to find in the record any objection thereto. In the absence of a proper and seasonably
objection, an error such as this will be deemed waived.
We
hold, therefore, that defendant's failure to so object precludes assertion of this error.
Affirmed.

WE CONCUR:

I. Daniel Stewart, Justice

Richard C. Howe, Justice

Christine M. Durham, Justice

Dean E. Conder, District Judge
Oaks, Justice, having resigned, does not participate
herein; Conder, District Judge, sat.

23. 87 P.2d at 811.
24. Stee State v. Hofer, 238 Iowa 820, 28 N.W.2d 475, 481
(1947); Proctor v. State, 235 Ga. 720, 221 S.E.2d 556, 558-59
(1975); Shedden v. Stiles, supra note 22; People v. Dixon,
37 111. 2d 416, 226 N.E.2d 608, 610 (1967); State v. Solomon,
supra note 22.
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JOHN S. DAVIS
Defendant Pro Se
1068 N. Grand Circle
Provo, Utah 84604
377-6821
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
vs.

:
:

MOTION TO AMEND THE COURT'S
MINUTE ENTRY DATED
NOVEMBER 26, 1982

:

JOHN SHEPARD DAVIS,
Defendant.

:

Case No. 8354

:

COMES NOW the Defendant and moves the above-entitled Court to amend its
Minute Entry dated November 26, 1982.

Section 77-35-32, Rule 32, Utah Rules •

of Criminal Procedure, U.C.A. (1953) says, "The case file shall include copies
of all minute entries of proceedings and orders made in that case." Section
77-35-30, Rule 30, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, U.C.A. (1953) says in
part (b), "Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record
and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected
by the court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court may order."
Section 77-35-22, Rule 22, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, U.C.A. (1953)
says in part (e), "The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence
imposed in an illegal manner, at any time."
Defendant moves the Court to amend the Minute Entry in the following
ways and for the reasons given:
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1.

The spelling of Defendantfs middle name should be corrected by

deleting the second "H" to show the proper spelling of "Shepard",
2.

in the first and second paragraphs the term "Motion for Arrested

Judgment" should be changed to properly reflect the accurate term of the
motion made by Defendant, which is a "Motion for Arrest of Judgment."
3.

The ninth paragraph should be re-worded to accurately reflect

the intent of the Court in a logical order, as follows:
This is the time set for sentencing. The crime charged,
"theft" is reduced to a Third Degree Felony. The maximum
sentence is a term in the Utah State Prison not to exceed
five years and a fine of $5,000. Imposition of a fine and
prison sentence is stayed and the Defendant is placed on
probation for 2 years. Defendant is to work for the Utah
County Sanity Administration one day a week for 50 weeks,
with no charge to Utah County or to the State of Utah. Work
arrangements shall be arranged through the Sanity Administration by way of the Adult Probation and Parole Office. Restitution shall be as determined in the Civil law suit re:
Charley Joseph and Joseph Mascaro. Defendant is on stiff
probation for two years and is not to use liquor, drugs, or
make any violation of the law during that period.
As the ninth paragraph is presently worded, it is not only confusing, but it
is also in violation of the proper procedure to be followed under the
sentencing statute, Section 76-3-201, U.C.A. (1953) and could raise many
questions about the legality of the procedure followed on November 26, 1982.
The amended wording gets around the requirements of Section 76-3-201 and is
proper procedure under Section 77-18-1, Criminal Procedure Code, U.C.A. (1953).
The amended wording also better conforms to the standard form "Utah State
Adult Probation and Parole Probation Agreement" which was furnished by the
department of Adult Probation and Parole and which was signed by the Defendant
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on December 1, 1982.
Dated November 10, 1984.
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JOipf S. DAVIS, Defendant Pro Se
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I personally delivered a copy of the foregoing
"Amended Motion for a New Trial and Arrest of Judgment11 and "Motion to
Amend the Court's Minute Entry Dated November 26, 1982" to the office of
the Utah County Attorney, County Courthouse, Provo, Utah 84601 this 13th
day of November, 1984.

JOffiUS. DAVIS

JOHN S. DAVIS
Defendant Pro Se
1068 N. Grand Circle
Provo, Utah 84604
377-6821
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

AMENDED MOTION FOR A
NEW TRIAL AND
ARREST OF JUDGMENT

:
:

JOHN SHEPARD DAVIS,
Defendant.

:

Case No. 8354

:

COMES NOW the Defendant and amends his Motion for a New Trial and
Arrest of Judgment dated November 24, 1982. This Amended Motion is made
pursuant to Rule 15, U.R.C.P. and by the written consent of the Utah County
Attorney's Office and the above entitled Court in the Stipulation and Order
dated October 25, 1984.
Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment is amended by the addition of
the following point as an additional basis for the motion.
POINT IIA
It is reversible error for the jury to take Exhibit
deposition, with them into deliberation.

lf

P-lff, a partial

When the closing arguments were

finished, the Bailiff took the jury to lunch and then immediately into their
deliberations.

This is shown by the minute entry of the Clerk and by the
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transcript of the trial proceedings.
The minute entry of the proceedings of the trial as kept by the Clerk,
records the following applicable events:
"Arguments concluded, the Defense and State counsel approached
the bench and out of jury hearing said motion, the Defendant
renewed its motion for mistrial. Motion denied. The Case is
submitted to the jury at this time. Bailiff Willis Vincent took
the jury to lunch at this time, and admonished to keep the jury
together. Jury is to go directly to jury room to deliberate
after lunch hour. Bailiffs were sworn in.
"Deliberations began at 2:25 p.m.
"At 8:00 p.m., the Jury was returned to the Courtroom at this
time. (deliberation for 5 1/2 hours) Clerk called the roll
and all jurors were present. Jury Foreman, Alan C. Cameron,
stated the jury had reached a verdict."
The transcript of the proceedings of the trial as recorded by the Court
Reporter record the following events:
THE COURT:

The record should indicate we're outside the
presence of the jury.

MR. STANGER:

THE COURT:

Your Honor, I would again make a motion for
mistrial on the basis that on four different
occasions on the grounds that the Prosecutor
is telling the jury of the fiduciary duty by
lawyers and their clients.

Well, your motion is denied.
this is proper argument.

MR. STANGER:

The Court feels that

Thank you.

(After the matter was argued to the Court and jury by both
sides, the jury retired to the jury room for the determination
of a verdict.)
(Whereupon a roll call was made of the jury and all the jurors
were present.)
THE COURT:
FOREMAN:

Ladies and gentlemen, have you reached a verdict?

We have.
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The deposition marked Exhibit P-1 was taken into the deliberations of
the jury and weighed heavily in reaching a verdict, as shown in the attached
affidavit of a member of the jury.
Taking depositions into the jury room during deliberations is
prohibited by statute in the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
"Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with
them the instructions of the court and all exhibits and
papers which have been received as evidence, except
depositions; and each juror may also take with him any
notes of the testimony or other proceedings taken by
himself, but not taken by any other person, (emphasis
added) (Section 77-35-17(k), Utah Code Ann. (1953)).
The basis for this statute has been well established law in Utah
for more than forty years.

In State v. Solomon, (1939) 96 Utah 500,

87 P.2d 807, the Utah Supreme Court distinguished depositions as not
being "documentary evidence11.

The Court said:

"But such testimony, even though taken by a reporter,
transcribed and certified, is not documentary evidence
to be received in writing and given to the jury."
The reasoning of the Court in the Solomon case is set forth on
page 811.

It says:
"A written instrument, made an exhibit in the cause but
not consisting of testimony of a witness in the case, may
of course be taken to the jury room the same as maps,
diagrams, and other exhibits. But the testimony of a
witness is in a different catagory. Such is the provision
of the statutes and the common law always excluded
depositions and written testimony from being carried from
the bar by the jury. We can see no reason why the court
should depart from the well established rule. It may often
happen that the testimony on one side is oral from
witnesses produced before the jury, while the testimony
for the other side on essential matters is in the form of
depositions or in the transcript from testimony at a
previous hearing. If the hearing lasts for any length of
time and the jury takes the depositions or transcript to
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be read and discussed while the oral evidence contra has
in measure faded from the memory of the jurors, it is
obvious that the side sustained by written evidence is
given an undue advantage. The law does not permit depositions or witnesses to go to the jury room. Why should
a witness be permitted to go there in the form of written
testimony?" (citations omitted)
It is likely that the jury might have reached a different verdict
if they had not had the deposition with them for five and a half hours
in deliberations.

This constitutes good cause for the arrest of judgment

in this case and the matter should be either dismissed or retried.
The Defendant's Motion for a New Trial is amended by the addition
of the following point as an additional basis for the motion.
POINT IIIA
Under Section 77-35-24, Utah Code Ann. (1953), Rule 24, Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure, the Court may "grant a new trial in the interest
of justice if there is any error or impropriety which had a substantial
adverse effect upon the rights of a party."

The jury, in taking the depo-

sition into its deliberations, as alleged in the foregoing Point IIA was
an error which had a substantial adverse effect on the Defendant.

This

fact situation falls squarely within the example discussed, supra, by the
Utah Supreme Court in the Solomon case.

The evidence by the State included

the deposition which went to the jury deliberations, whereas the evidence
by the Defendant was oral and none of it went with the jury in written
testimony.

As the Utah Supreme Court said, "it is obvious that the side

(the State in this case) sustained by written evidence is given an undue
advantage."

By any interpretation, that means that the Defendant failed to

receive a fair trial and the error is reversible.
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The facts of this case, as described in the minute entry of the Clerk
and the transcript of proceedings by the Court Reporter, and quoted in Point
IIA, supra, show that there was also error and impropriety in the way the
Court failed to control the issuance of the exhibits to the jury as they went
into deliberations.

The Court chose to recess the proceedings and send the

jury to lunch immediately prior to the commencement of their deliberations•
The State and the Defendant were both justified under the circumstances to
assume that the Court would either take personal supervision or properly
instruct the Bailiff, in the Judge's anticipated absence, to make sure that
Rule 17(k) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure was properly complied
with, in that the jury was to be given the instructions of the court and
all of the exhibits and papers which were received in evidence, but to exclude
the depositions.

The failure of the Court to responsibly handle its duty at

a time when the proceedings were in recess and the parties were not present
to personally observe which items were given to the jury, not only resulted
in the error by the jury, but it also denied the Defendant of due process
in this case at a critical time when actions were taken and decisions made
which could and did result in a detriment to him.
The third error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect
upon the rights of the Defendant was in the way the Court handled the request
by the jury that they be given a copy of Defendant's testimony.

The record

in this case includes a short note on a small piece of paper, signed by the
jury foreman, requesting that the jury be given a copy of Defendant's testimony.
The Court summarily denied the request, not in the presence of the parties or
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their Counsel, and told the jury to use their best memory, and then directed
the Clerk to attach the note to the jury instructions in the Court's file.
The court record gives no other indication that the parties were notified
of the request by the jury or the response by the Court, or that the parties
had access to the Court's file after this incident and prior to the verdict
by the jury.

While the procedure followed by the Court may be allowable

under the Rules, the request by the jury should have allerted the Court that
the jury had some sort of document, such as the deposition, to which it was
giving serious consideration, and the jury wanted to also consider the
Defendant's explanation in written form.

This is a fact which the Judge knew,

or should have known at that point, but which he failed to disclose to the
Defendant.

This also resulted in a lack of due process for the Defendant and

for which the Defendant should have been made aware.
It is likely that the outcome of this case might have been different
and in the Defendant's favor if these errors and improprieties had not been
allowed to occur.

In the interest of justice a new trial should be granted

because of the substantial adverse effect upon the rights of the Defendant.
Dated this 10th day of November, 1984.

JOHN/g. DAVIS
Defendant Pro Se

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH
AFFIDAVIT

Plaintiff,
VS.

Case No. 8354

JOHN SHEPARD DAVIS
Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

)
) SS.
COUNTY OF UTAH )
MRS. LINDA B. McDONALD, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

I was a member of the jury in the above entitled case in October

of 1982.
2.

During our deliberations, the jury had with them and carefully

revievred the partial deposition of the defendant labeled Exhibit P-1.
3.

The deposition labeled Exhibit P-1 weighed very heavily in my

decision to find the defendant guilty.
Dated this 16th day of November, 1984.

•O-

j"<~

"\

LINDA 3. McDONALD
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JOHN S. DAVIS
Defendant Pro Se
1068 W. Grand Circle
Provo, Utah 84604
377-6821
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

REQUEST FOR HEARING

THE STATE OF UTAH

ON MOTIONS

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 8354

JOHN SHEPARD DAVIS,
Defendant.

COMES NOW the Defendant and requests that the above-entitled Court
schedule a hearing on Defendant's motions at its earliest possible convenience
in Manti, Utah.

Due to the nature of the issues involved, this hearing should

be held prior to, and independently of, any hearing on the issue of restitution.
Dated this 26th day of December, 1984.

j£f?N S. DAVIS', Defendant Pro Se
I hereby certify that I personally delivered a copy of the foregoing
Request for Hearing on Motions to the office of the Utah County Attorney,
County Courthouse, Provo, Utah 84601 this 26th day of December, 1984.
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160 North Main
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State vs. Davis

Dear Carole,
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Manti on January 30, 19 85/ at 2:00 P.M. in the ahnvp-captioneri
case.
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JOHN S. DAVIS
Defendant Pro Se
1068 N. Grand Circle
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377-6821
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

OBJECTIONS TO

:

PROPOSED ORDERS

:

JOHN SHEPARD DAVIS
Defendant.

:

Case No. 8354

:

COMES NOW the Defendant, John Shepard Davis, and enters his objections
to the proposed order in reference to the hearing held on November 26, 1982,
as follows:
1.

The proposed order cannot be filed because such filing does

not conform to the time requirements of Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice
in the District Courts and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah.
Rule 2.9 is applicable in this instance because RuLe 3.1 of the same
Rules clearly states, "These rules shall govern the practice and procedure
in the District Courts and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah in all
matters not specifically covered by the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure or
Rules of Criminal Procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court."
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filed within fifteen (15) days after the November 26, 1982 hearing, when
the court reporter's notes were probably still available.

At the hearing on

January 30, 1985 the assistant county attorney said that he did not understand
that a written order was necessary, which is hardly believable since Rule 2.9
applies to all of the Districts in the State of Utah.

Nevertheless, at the

January 30, 1985 hearing the court made it perfectly clear that the minute
entry did not constitute the courtfs order and the court ordered him to
prepare such an order.

Now, only one week shy of six months after that hearing,

and after his withdrawal from the case, he is trying to file the written order.
The County Attorney's office has previously taken a position of strict
conformity with the rules.

At the January 30, 1985 hearing, the Defendant was

asking to be allowed to file a motion for a new trial.

In response, the

assistant county attorney put strong emphasis on the necessity for strick
conformity to the time requirements under the rules. He said:
. . . itfs the State's position that you have a very specific
Rule, Rule 24. It's in 77-35-24 but, in any event, the Rule provides
that you can only file in a criminal case for a new trial up to ten
days after sentence is imposed and it's our position that the sentence
was imposed or ordered, an order of sentence was made, and that the
time period began to run in accordance with Rule 24 on November 26, 1982.
I think the Court file will reflect the Minute Entry on that particular
date indicating that sentence was imposed by the Court and you just
can't get around the rule. . . . Now the rule allows time during that
ten day period, to extend the time period if that's appropriate; however,
no motion was made to extend the time period in this particular case. . .
Basically, it's the State's position that the provision of the statute
is clear and that there has not been compliance with the statute and
it's not properly before the Court.
The court agreed with that position in January of 1985, because it said
to the Defendant, "Well, I disagree with you so the Motion for New Trial is
denied because it was not made timely within the time after I imposed sentence
which is on the date as set forth in the Minute Entry of November 26, 1982."
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ThatTs right, so if you disagree with what my order was,
you d better get a copy of the transcript and check it out
because that's what ITm going to be bound by and not by what
some Clerk's said I said. It might be a different clerk every
day, you know.
f

Maybe it was (my clerk) writing it but I don't agree with
everything she writes frankly*
Once again I thought there had been an order signed but it's
your responsibility or the responsibility of the State's attorney
to prepare the written order so far as I'm concerned and that
order should be prepared and submitted to the Court for signature.
If it hasn't been done, it should be done.
For the purpose of the record the Court does not consider,
and let there be no question about this, a minute entry made by
a clerk as being the order of the Court because the clerks are not
trained, they don't take it down by shorthand or verbatim. Sometimes
they don't hear exactly what I've said properly and they've
just not been trained and they vary and they also sometimes
don't understand the legal words that are used. They put their
own views on it and the Court does not consider a minute entry
binding as a Court order. The order is what the Court said on the
record at the time of sentencing and that's all I can say about: it.
By the foregoing statements of this Court, the Minute Entry cannot be
used as the basis of the Court's written Order.

The use of one's own memory

as the basis for preparing an accurate memorialization of the Court's verbal
ruling thirty-two (32) months after the hearing is highly questionable.

At

the hearing on January 30, 1985, the Court indicated that his memory was not
entirely accurate as to exactly what was said.

Defendant, with supporting

documentation of the Probation Order, which was signed five (5) days after
the November 26, 1982 hearing, moved the Court to make some technical
adjustments in the wording and was rejected by the Court as having no proper
foundation.
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4.

The proposed order cannot be filed because it does not conform

to the statutory requirements of section 76-3-201 U.C.A. (1953) as amended.
That statute, which governs sentencing in criminal cases, only allows for
five different categories of sentence, and the proposed order does not
specify which of those are included.

The sentencing statute also classifies

restitution as being in addition to the sentence, not a part of it. When
the sentencing court orders restitution, he must first make a finding that
there are pecuniary damages suffered by the victim.

Pecuniary damages can

only include special damages and not general or punitive damages, which may
be included in a civil judgment.

The court must also limit those pecuniary

damages to the amount that the victim could actually recover in a civil action
against the defendant.
If the court finds such pecuniary damages, he must make his reasons
a part of the court record as to why restitution is appropriate or is not
appropriate.

He must also show that he has taken into consideration several

specific items which are listed in the statute.
If the Defendant objects to imposition of restitution, the amount, or
the distribution of restitution, which this defendant did then and does now,
the Court must allow the Defendant a full hearing on the issue of restitution
at the time of sentencing.
These requirements have not been met, and therefore, the written order
does not meet the statutory requirements if the order for restitution is to
be included.

- 8-

5.

The last written order of the Court in the file extends the

period of probation to April 1, 1985. The State's failure to enter a subsequent
written order making any further extensions of the probation period prior to
April 1, 1985, has allowed the probationary period and the court's jurisdiction
to terminate as a matter of law.
If the county attorney's office wants to retain jurisdiction, then it
has the obligation to enter a written order to preserve that jurisdiction.
If it wants to obtain a judgment of conviction, it needs to prepare it timely,
and not be delinquent while memories fade and transcripts are lost before
it tries to enter the written order.

That is granting the State a judgment

without due process, especially when there is evidence that the verbal ruling
was not in conformity with the written order which was submitted much later.
6.

Defendant again raises his objection to jurisdiction which was

raised at the hearing on January 30, 1985. The 1984 amendment to section
77-18-1 U.C.A. (1953) as amended, provides that following eighteen (18) months
on compliance with the terms of probation, then probation is automatically
terminated as a matter of law.

That statute also provides that if there is

restitution still unpaid as the only remaining item, jurisdiction of that
matter is transferred to the civil court for collection.

In January of 1985

this court indicated that this amendment to the statute does not govern this
present case because the sentence was issued prior to the effective date of
the amendment.

Defendant now contends that since the written order has not

been filed prior to the effective date of the amendment, that it is governed
by the amendment, and therefore, probation and jurisdiction have terminated
as a matter of law.

- 9 -

7.

As objection to the proposed order from the hearing dated

January 30, 1985, Defendant incorporates foregoing paragraphs #1 and #5.
Defendant also challenges the accuracy of the order.

Most notably, the

order does not even indicate the date of the hearing, which was January
30, 1985.

It also fails to even mention the issue of automatic termination

of probation, as discussed in the foregoing paragraph #6.

There is a

transcript of that hearing, covering twenty-two (22) pages.

A careful

review of that transcript will indicate that the three paragraphs included
in the proposed order are not sufficient to cover the rulings of the court.
DATED this 31st day of July, 1985.

S. DAVIS
defendant Pro Se

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I personally delivered a copy of the foregoing
Objections to Proposed Orders to the office of the Utah County Attorney at
the Courthouse in Provo, Utah this 31st

>ARYJ

ANDERSON

<VTA.fr

CoT5-^ce'

JERIL B WILSON Ccn-r i« one*J ONFL MINER CcnT'S* c~e<RONALD M SMITH Assessor
NOALL T WOOTTON

State of Utah

Arcmey

EcWOOD L SUNDBERG Aucf to'
W.LLIAM F HUISH

0'k

NINA B RE1D Re-cder
MACK HOLLEY Shenff

C

COUNTY BUILDING • PROVO, UTAH 84601 • TELEPHONE 601 373-5510

^^T'

CLYDE R NAYLOR f^g nee,
STANLEY H WALKER Treasurer

July 1 7 , 1 9 8 5

H o n o r a b l e Don V. T i b b s
Sixth D i s t r i c t C o u r t
S a n p e t e County C o u r t h o u s e
160 North Main S t r e e t
M a n t i , Utah 8 4 6 4 2
Re:

S t a t e of Utah v. J o h n S h e p h a r d

Davis

Dear J u d g e T i b b s :
In J a n u a r y of this y e a r I t e r m i n a t e d my e m p l o y m e n t at t h e
Utah County A t t o r n e y ' s o f f i c e .
It has s u b s e q u e n t l y come to my
a t t e n t i o n that no o n e has p r e p a r e d t h e O r d e r s in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h
your d i r e c t i v e at the last h e a r i n g on J a n u a r y 3 0 , 1 9 8 5 .
E v i d e n t l y a m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g did o c c u r between m y s e l f and my
s u c c e s s o r in t h e County A t t o r n e y ' s o f f i c e and I a p o l o g i z e for t h e
i n c o n v e n i e n c e and for t h e o v e r s i g h t .
At th e last h e a r i n g , y o u r Honor d i r e c t e d m e to obtain a copy
of the tran s c r i p t of t h e a c t i o n s of t h e Court at t h e time of
s e n t e n c i n g on N o v e m b e r 2 6 , 1 9 8 2 .
I m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r t h e Court
h e a r i n g , I d i s c u s s e d t h e m a t t e r w i t h C . Howard W a t k i n , C . S . R . ,
the Court R e p o r t e r w h o was p r e s e n t on that d a t e .
Evidently the
t r a n s c r i p t of t h e h e a r i n g w a s left by M r . W a t k i n with the Clerk
of t h e Court in P r o v o . H o w e v e r , M r . W a t k i n ' s t r a n s c r i p t i o n
c a n n o t pre sently be l o c a t e d .
F o r that r e a s o n , I h a v e e n c l o s e d an
A f f i d a v i t g e n e r a l l y v e r i f y i n g t h e facts c o n t a i n e d in the M i n u t e
Entry on N o v e m b e r 2 6 , 1 9 8 2 and a l s o t h e c o n t e n t s of t h e m a t t e r s
set forth in t h e p r o p o s e d Order m e m o r i a l i z i n g t h e o r d e r s of t h e
C o u r t on t hat d a t e .
I have also e n c l o s e d a p r o p o s e d Order
d o c u m e n t in g what o c c u r r e d at t h e last h e a r i n g .
C o p i e s of t h e
A f f i d a v i t and of both orders have been f o r w a r d e d to t h e D e f e n d a n t
as indicat ed on t h e M a i l i n g C e r t i f i c a t e s .

H o n o r a b l e Don V,
July 1 7 , 1 9 8 5
Page Two

Tibbs

Charlene Barlow, Deputy Utah County A t t o r n e y , will represent
t h e S t a t e o f Utah on any f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s in t h i s c a s e .
H o w e v e r , I will m a k e any a p p e a r a n c e s w i t h h e r , e i t h e r as c o c o u n s e l or as a w i t n e s s upon t h e C o u r t ' s r e q u e s t .
T h a n k you f o r
y o u r a t t e n t i o n to t h e s e m a t t e r s .
Sincerely,
^^yjt&n

^ St e v e n B .' k i 11 p a c k
SBK:kjr
Approval

as to f o r m :

(' l- -

-T^L

th a r 1 e n e

Barlow

\.^
CERTIFICATE

OF M A I L I N G

I hereby c e r t i f y t h a t I m a i l e d a true and c o r r e c t copy o f
t h e f o r e g o i n g to R o n a l d S t a n g e r , 55 E a s t C e n t e r , P r o v o , U t a h ,
8 4 6 0 1 and to John S h e p h e r d D a v i s , 1 0 6 8 North G r a n d C i r c l e , P r o v o
U t a h , 8 4 6 0 1 , by p>j aI ac iz}n n
g said copy in t h e U. S. M a i l , p o s t a g e
prepaid, this
^ JM d ay of J u l y , 1985.

OF ml: S,'l-Myy * r.;,.r
!5S5 C

" -2 A1 /,:3 f

NOALL T . W00TT0N
Utah County A t t o r n e y
Room 107

Utah County Building
Provo, Utah
84601
T e l e p h o n e : 373-5510 ext 320
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
AFFIDAVIT

Plaintiff,
vs .

Case No. 8354
JOHN SHEPHARD

DAVIS,

Defendant.
STATE OF

UTAH

)

COUNTY OF UTAH

)

STEVEN

B.

:ss

KILLPACK

deposes

and

states

on

his

oath

as

follows:
1.
captioned
2.
sentencing
3.

That

he

was

the Prosecuting

Attorney

in

the

above

case.
That he was present on November 2 6 , 1982 at the time of
in the above captioned
That

the matters

with the Court and dated

case.

set forth

in the Minute Entry on file

November 2 6 , 1982 are true and accurate

to the best of his recollection.

4.

That

Affidavit
occurred

the proposed

accurately

Order

filed

memorializes

concurrently

the order

of

with

this

sentence

which

on November 2 6 , 1982 to the best of his r e c o l l e c t i o n .

5.

That

no

transcript

of

November 2 6 , 1982 is presently
DATED

this

jf

SUBSCRIBED

SWORN

sentencing

hearing

on

in existence to his k n o w l e d g e .

day of

AND

the

, 1985.

<£&H£/.

to

before

me

this

^^~day

of

, 1985

_ />/// 4
/

' ,
sS/fa/i/sh

Notary Pub 1 i c
Residing at:
My Commission

Expires:

CERTIFICATE
I hereby
the

foregoing

Grand
Center,
Adult

certify

Circle,
Provo,
Probation

that

Affidavit
Provo,
Utah,
and

OF MAILING

I mailed

to

Utah,

John

Shephard

84601;

84601;
Parole,

8 4 6 0 1 ; and Joe T e s c h , 30 North

a true

Ronald

Richard
184 West

and correct
Davis

at

Stanger

Lindsey,

of

1068 North
at

55

District

200 South,

Main, # 2 , Heber

copy

Provo,

East

Agent,
Utah,

City, Utah, 84032

O Or

by

placing

said

Outlay of

copy

QliAj

in t h e U. S . M a i l ,

postage

, 198 <T .

?j a

^hMM^g£&

Secretary

prepaid,

this

N O A L L T. W O O T T O N
Utah County A t t o r n e y
Room 107
Utah County B u i l d i n g
P r o v o , Utah
84601
T e l e p h o n e : 3 7 3 - 5 5 1 0 ext 320
A t t o r n e y for P l a i n t i f f
IN THE F O U R T H J U D I C I A L D I S T R I C T C O U R T OF UTAH

COUNTY

S T A T E OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

]

Plaintiff,

]i

JOHN SHEPHARD D A V I S ,

]
}
]

vs.

O R D E R
Case No. 8354

Defendant.

The

above

Defendant's
November

entitled

Motions

26,

1982

to
and

T r i a l , the D e f e n d a n t
and
The

the

State

parties

of

matter
Amend
upon

the
the

appearing

Utah

previously

being

entered
probation

conducted

hearings

the

The Court

being

m a k e s and enters the

Court's

into
to

Motion.

fully

the

Court

Minute

Defendant's

represented

Defendant's

Court.

before

on

Entry

Motion

for

in person and r e p r e s e n t i n g

extending

on

came

advised

a

April
Both

by

Steven

B.

Stipulation
1,

1985.

parties

dated
a

New

himself

Killpack.
and

Order

The

Court

addressed

in the p r e m i s e s

the

now

the

hereby

following:

O

O R D E R
1.
until

The

the

Defendant's

Court makes

of r e s t i t u t i o n
Defendant
directs
Parole
that
is

to

the

civil

is

continued

determination

of

and

the

Department

the m a t t e r

for

a restitution

litigation

arising

such

out

indefinitely

regarding

in t h i s

payment

parties

set

a final

o w i n g by the D e f e n d a n t

completes
the

probation

amount

c a s e and until

restitution.
of

the

Adult
hearing

of the

facts

The

the

Court

Probation
at

and

such

time

in this

case

concluded.
2.

The Defendant's Motions'to Amend

N o v e m b e r 2 6 , 1 9 8 2 and for a New Trial
3.

are

the M i n u t e Entry
denied.

T h e S t a t e is d i r e c t e d to p r e p a r e an O r d e r

t h e Order of S e n t e n c e e n t e r e d
DATED this _ 2 £ S

day

of

, 198 <, .

DwuJ^. T i b b s
D i s t r t^t^ J iidlj e
as to

John S h e p h a r d

Form:

Davis

memorializing

by the C o u r t on N o v e m b e r 2 6 , 1 9 8 2 .

VkK

Approval

dated

.

^ AKA^^^
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I hereby
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foregoing
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Provo,

Provo,
Utah,

Probation

certify
Order
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84601;

that

OF

MAILING
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84601;
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a true

Shephard
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Davis
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Lindsey,
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at

correct
1068
55

District

North
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JJ

of

Grand
Center,

Agent,

Adult

and P a r o l e , 1 8 4 West 200 S o u t h , P r o v o , U t a h , 8 4 6 0 1 ; and

Joe T e s c h , 30 North M a i n , # 2 , Heber C i t y , U t a h , 8 4 0 3 2 by
said

copy

copy

in the U. S. M a i l , p o s t a g e

- // /

prepaid,

this

198 ^ .

/

Secretary

/

placing

-Q-^CJday

of

"'"^r.-s-X^:^' 1 : rv.v:
.'?/.».
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T. Wootton
County Attorney
107
County Building
, Utah
84601
h o n e : 3 7 3 - 5 5 1 0 ext. 320
ley for P l a i n t i f f
IN THE FOURTH J U D I C I A L D I S T R I C T COURT OF UTAH

COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

OF UTAH
i

Plaintiff,

I
j

.HEPHARD DAVIS
Defendant,
The
cing

guilty
r

20,

a

a new

conducted
the

the

Steven
trial
a

hearing

of

matter

1982.

B.

and

hearing
and

a

was

State

came

The

theft,

Defendant

and

Attorney,

26,

jury

1982.

Stanger,

for

entitled

November
by

Case No. 8354

)

above

on

O R D E R

argument

Court

Defendant

was

previously

second

degree

The

for an
the
upon

by

represented

Killpack.

upon

the

represented

was

also

before

his
by

Motions

moved

of

judgment.

of

the

Motions,

on

attorney,

Deputy

Defendant

arrest

the

felony,

for

Utah
the
The

Defendant.

both

Motions

snied.
le

Court

then

conducted

:ing h e a r i n g , both Noal1

a

sentencing

T. W o o t t o n ,

hearing.

Utah

County

At

the

Attorney,

and S t e v e n
Court

B. K i l l p a c k , D e p u t y Utah C o u n t y

regarding

Stanger,

sentencing

Attorney

Davis, addressed
also
Adult

considered

and

for

the

State

of

Defendant

and

the D e f e n d a n t ,

addressed

Utah.

Both
John

report

and

previously

Parole.

Parole

A

was m a d e

filed

copy

of

available

the

Ronald
Shephard

the Court on b e h a l f of t h e D e f e n d a n t .
the

Probation

Probation

for

Attorney

The

Court

by the D e p a r t m e n t

the

report

from

to the D e f e n d a n t

of

Adult

and

his

attorney.
Whereupon,

the

m a d e and e n t e r e d

Court

the

being

fully

Defendant

Pursuant

Defendant
2.

a

Section
under

judgment

for a third
Defendant

S t a t e Prison
3.

to

is s e n t e n c e d

Accordingly,

in

the

premises,

following:
O R D E R OF

1.

advised

SENTENCE
76-3-402

the next

of

is

lower

conviction

d e g r e e felony
sentenced

is

the

Utah

category

of

entered

against

imprisonment

at

t e r m , not to e x c e e d

The Defendant

is o r d e r e d

The

prison

Code,

the

offense.
the

theft.
to

for an i n d e t e r m i n a t e

of

the

Utah

five y e a r s .

to pay a fine in the a m o u n t

of

$5,000.
4.

fine

and

defendant

is placed

on p r o b a t i o n

following

t e r m s and

conditions:

a.
Administrator

Defendant

is

one day a week

to

sentence

are

for a p e r i o d

work

for

the

both

and

the

of two y e a r s on

the

Utah

for 50 w e e k s w i t h o u t

stayed

County

Sanity

compensation.
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84601
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Stanger

Lindsey,
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District
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Joe T e s c h , 30 North M a i n , # 2 , Heber C i t y , U t a h , 8 4 0 3 2 , by p l a c i n g
said

copy

in t h e U. S. M a i l , p o s t a g e

prepaid,

t h i s Q r y / ' ^ ' a a y of

, 198

~/?f/''/-y!

c^V

Secretary

n • •* <

FILED

Ec5 OCT 10 /.;!{T; 22
• J . I ; R.K
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UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY
Room 1Q7, County Building
Provo, Utah 846C1
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V<V

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff,

:

ORDER

2

VS.

JOHN SHEPARD DAVIS,
Defendant.

:

Case No. 8354

:

The above entitled matter came before the Honorable Don
V. Tibbs on October 1, 1985 on defendant's Request for Hearing on
Defendant's Objections to Proposed Orders.

Defendant was

present, acting pro se, and the State was represented by Deputy
Utah County Attorney Charlene Barlow.
The Court heara arguments from both parties and askea for
comment from Steven B. Killpack, Utah County Sanity
Administrator.

Defenaant reneweo his motions for a new trial ana

for arrest of 3udgment which were again aenied.
The Court, being fully aavisea in the premises, maae and
enterec the following:

W5CC1-2

SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF

SANPETE

-..v./-

.STATE OF UTAH

DON V. TIBBS, Judge
C. Howard Watkin, Court Reporter

/nil: 31

M4S

Date.

nr.T,

Case No.

8354

i , 19K5
(UTAH COUNTY MATTER

COUNSEL (Counsel Present)

TITLE (Parties Present)
THE STATE OF UTAH,

Charlene Barlow, Deputy Utah County Attorney
Plaintiff,

r - f e ^ fc^j•£$/%%£ Q+T-«Zjf2&Z*

:

VS

JOHN SHEPHERD DAVIS,

C

John S. DAvis, Pro Se
Defendant.

MINUTE ENTRY

Proceedings Before the Court

) DIVORCE
) ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
) SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER
) PROBATE
XX) CRIMINAL
) ADOPTION
)OTHER

DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S
PROPOSED ORDERS

dJ^^^^.

£5*yr/y*-,*J
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&
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/

^
•ecst

^^A.JJK]
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WANDA BARTHOLOMEW

JL^. Lt-<M-< ^tn
„<^J? tf^^j

.<~-~r?/L-*L&-

Zx^u d 7/jfcnL

t'
Don V. Tibbs, District Judge

Court Clerk
•iqi-

o.i

8.

A restitution hearing is scheduled for October 28,

1985 at lfc:06 A.M. in Manti, Utah, at which time the plaintiff
will present the aocuments and affidavits to the Court and the
defendant will present any legal basis he has for cisagreeing
with the oocuments and amounts.
DATED this

/

_day of October, 1985.
*ffE--COURT:

Approval as to Form:

JGKk SH EPARD DAVIS

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Order to John S. Davis, Defendant Pro Se, at
lfc/68 North Grana Circle, Provo 84604 this _jj[^£__day of October,
1985.

V

/jL(t>ljt'k£
/

-3-

ORDER OF SENTENCE
1.

Defendant's renewed motions for new trial and arrest

of judgment are denieG.
2.

Defendant's objection to the Proposed Orders is

3.

The Orders signed

ceniec.
July 23, 19b5, which memorialized

the Court's orders of November 26, 15b2 anc January 30, 1985, are
orderec fileo and are the Orders ot the Court in tnese matters.
4.

The supervision of the Department of Aault Probation

ana Parole over this defendant is terminated except for the
matter of restitution.
5.

The Court retains jurisdiction over determining

restitution in this matter.
6.

The Utah County Attorney's Office is orcered to

contact tne victims anC furnish the Court witn any and all
documents bearing on the victims' restitution claims, plus
affidavits that these claims are from final orders and any
balance owing to the victims from the defendant.
7.

The Utah County Attorney's Office is to provide

copies of tnese documents and affidavits to tne defendant within
fifteen oavs.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
O R D E R
Plaintiff,
-vs-

Criminal No. 8354

JOHN SHEPARD DAVIS,
Defendant,
This matter came on for hearing on October 28, 1985, before
the Honorable Don V. Tibbs.

Defendant was present pro se and the

State was represented by Deputy Utah County Attorney, Charlene
Barlow.
The court heard arguments and received exhibits from both
parties regarding the questions of restitution.

The court also

indicated that it had received a letter from an attorney
representing one of the victims and allowed the parties to read
and respond to the letter.
The court, being fully advised in the premises, made and
entered the following:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1.

The defendant has complied with the conditions of

probation as imposed by the court on November 26, 1982, except
for the payment of restitution.
2.

The court stated at the November 26, 1982, sentencing

that the question of restitution would be determined by the civil

3.

The court-finds that the civil litigation as contained

in Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2 as presented at this restitution
hearing does fix the amount of restitution owing by defendant in
this case.
4.

The court specifically excepts from this order the

amounts listed in the exhibits as punitive damages.

Punitive

damages cannot be and are not ordered as restitution in this
criminal matter.
5.

The court finds the restitution owed by defendant to be

$73,461.45 as of November 26, 1982.
6.

That amount is the amount of money belonging to Charley

Joseph and Joseph Mascaro which was in the defendant's trust
account and wrongfully used by defendant.
7.

The court finds no advantage to keeping defendant on

supervised probation.
ORDER OF SENTENCE
1.

Supervised probation for the defendant's terminated.

2.

The defendant is ordered to pay the sum of $73,461.45

plus statutory interest on that amount from November 26, 1982, to
the victims, Charley Joseph and Joseph Mascaro.
Dated this

day of November, 1985.
BY THE COURT

DON V. TIBBS
Judge

Approved as to form

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Order
to John S. Davis, defendant, at 1068 North Grand Circle, Provo
84604, this ^QtT
day of October, 1985.

v///ftmffsd

Secretary

This brief dated this 21st day of February, 1986.
Respectfully Submitted,
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V

JOHN S. DAVIS
Appellant Pro Se

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I personally deliver four (4) copies
of the foregoing Brief to the office of the Utah Attorney
General, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114,
this 21st day of February, 1986.
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